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Throwing Black Babies Out With the
Bathwater:
A Child-Centered Challenge to Same-Sex
Adoption Bans
TANYA M. WASHINGTON*
Introduction
Children, for whom the state acts as parent, are particularly
vulnerable and in need of protection. Ironically, in the context of
bans that categorically prohibit adoption by gays and lesbians,' it is
state action that limits placement opportunities and denies orphans
the protection they deserve.2  The specific focus of this article is the
impact on Black orphans of placement bans that prohibit gay
adoption. Because of their racial minority status, these children are
characterized as "special needs" children, a category that also
includes children with medical and developmental disabilities, older
children, and sibling sets which are more difficult to place in
adoptive homes and often wait the longest before being adopted.3
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law; L.L.M. Harvard
Law School; J.D. University of Maryland School of Law. I would like to thank my colleagues for
their support and counsel, our wonderful law librarians for their invaluable research assistance,
my Research Assistant Sheena Bosket for her attention to detail, and the wonderful editors at
Hastings Race and Poverty Law Journal for their patience and skill.
1. Though these bans do not ban all placements, they do categorically ban all permanent
placements with gay parents and will therefore be referred to as categorical placement bans in this
article. Barbara Woodhouse, Waiting For Loving: The Child's Fundamental Right to Adoption,
34 CAP. U. L REv. 297, 318 (2005) (where she refers to these bans as "categorical bans"
according to their categorical exclusion of gay potential adoptive parents).
2. Some of these bans prohibit permanent placement of orphans with gay and lesbian couples
and individuals, while other more restrictive bans prohibit both. permanent placements and foster
care placements with gay and lesbian couples and individuals. Id. at 25-26.
3. "Special needs children.., suffer disproportionately from categorical barriers to adoption.
Remember that special needs children include not only disabled and older children, but also
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For many Black orphans the choice is not between placement with a
heterosexual parent or a gay or lesbian parent; rather, it is between
placement and non-placement. 4  Categorical placement bans are
incongruent with the reality that the child welfare system is
challenged by an overrepresentation of orphans5 of color and too few
available placements 6 for one of the most vulnerable demographics
America's Black orphans.7  This article assesses the
children of color (footnote omitted). These are the 'toughest children to place in adoptive homes'
and they 'often wait the longest before being adopted' (footnote omitted)." Woodhouse, supra
note 1, at 327. The characteristics of special needs orphans vary from state to state. During 2005,
the majority of waiting children in an overwhelming majority of states were characterized
as possessing one or more of the special needs characteristics. CHILDREN'S BUREAU,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, THE AFCARS REPORT STATE
SPECIFIC ADOPTION DATA, CHILD'S SPECIAL NEEDS FOR FY 2005, available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats-research/afcars/statistics/specnds tbl7-005.htm
[hereinafter AFCARS REPORT].
4. "The Lofton court reasoned that 'the legislature could rationally act on the theory that not
placing adoptees in homosexual households increases the probability that these children
eventually will be placed with married-couple families, thus furthering the state's goal of optimal
placement' (citation omitted). Yet such a policy virtually assures that some of these children will
never be adopted, a result which simply cannot be viewed as promoting their interests." Mark
Strasser, The Legislative Backlash to Advances in Rights for Same-Sex couples: Rebellion in the
Eleventh Circuit: On Lawrence, Lofion and the Best Interests of Children, 40 TULSA L. REV. 421,
440 (2005).
5. Throughout the article, I refer to children in foster care who are available for adoption as
orphans. I recognize that "orphan" has been used to describe children who have a lost bond with
a parent due to the death of that parent. Richard L. Brown, Disinheriting the "Legal Orphan ":
Inheritance Rights of Children After Termination of Parental Rights, 70 MO. L. REV. 125 (2005)
(noting, "[b]y 'orphans' we have meant children who have suffered the death of their parents"
and distinguishing orphans from legal orphans). I am not suggesting that clhildren in foster care,
despite the termination of parental rights, do not or cannot maintain an emotional bond and
relationship with their parents, which is not possible for children whose parents have died.
However, those who are orphaned by the death of their parents and those who are orphaned under
the law, by virtue of the termination of parental rights, share the reality of non-existent parental
care and protection. To the extent that children in foster and institutional care have no personal
advocate to secure the protection of their rights and interests, they are functionally orphans; See
DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE BASIC 146 (Civitas
Books 2002) (referring to children awaiting adoption as "legal orphans"); Heath Foster, Move
Toward Permanent Homes Is on a Faster Track, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 18, 1998,
at A 10 (referring to children awaiting adoptions as "orphans of the living"); Martin Guggenheim,
The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termination of Parental Rights of Children in
Foster Care-An Empirical Analysis in Two States, 29 FAM. L. Q. 121, 134 (1995).
6. Guggenheim, supra note 5, at 134.
7. "Not only are minority children overrepresented in foster care but, once in the system,
minority youth, especially African Americans, tend to remain in care longer." Ann Garland,
Elissa Ellis-MacLeod, John Landsverk, William Granger & Ivory Johnson, MINORITY
POPULATIONS IN THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM: The Visibility Hypothesis Reexamined,
American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 68(1), 142 (1998); The emphasis in this article on Black
orphans should not be interpreted to mean that other groups of children are not harmed by these
bans. They are. "Indeed, precluding gays and lesbians from adopting may mean that some
children will not be adopted at all (citation omitted). Such children may have to live in state
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constitutionality of placement bans in light of these child welfare
realities.
Courts have recognized that children possess a negative liberty
interest in freedom from abuse and harm in the foster care context. 8
The open question is "not whether they are entitled to protection
from harm, but rather, how broad that protection must be." 9  This
article examines the expansion of the negative liberty interest to
include protection against state action that limits or forecloses the
possibility of adoption, which results in an increased likelihood that
orphans will experience the harms associated with extended
temporary and institutional care. This article grounds rights
generated by this negative liberty interest within substantive due
process guarantees' 0  and asserts the best interest of the child
standard as a restraint on the state's parens patriae and police power
authority to limit or foreclose permanent placement options for
foster institutions, and they 'may never experience the joy of family life or care by a devoted
parent (quotation omitted)."' Mark Strasser, Legislative Presumptions and Judicial Assumptions:
On Parenting, Adoption, and the Best Interest of the Child, 45 KAN. L. REV. 49, 76 (1996).
These categorical gay adoption bans also harm children whose deceased parents have assigned
guardianship to a gay or lesbian relative and children whose gay or lesbian biological parent's
partner wishes to adopt them. The focus of this article on the impact of these bans on Black
orphans is not a commentary on the significance of the harm suffered by other children by virtue
of these bans. My decision to focus on this demographic is a strategic one. I believe that it may
provide judges with a less politically controversial justification for finding the bans
unconstitutional. I also believe that it will provide a reference point for collaborative efforts
between communities of color and gay and lesbian communities, which are both adversely
impacted by categorical placement bans. I am confident that if these bans are successfully
challenged on the grounds asserted in this article, narrowly focused though they are on a subset of
the affected population, other communities harmed by them will be served.
8. See, e.g., Roska v. Peterson, 304 F.3d 982, 994 (10th Cir. 2002); Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d
798, 807 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc); Norfleet v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. 989 F.2d 289, 291-93
(8th Cir. 1993); Yvonne L. v. New Mexico Dep't of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883 (10th Cir.
1992); Meador v. Cabinet for Human Reg., 902 F.2d 474 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that foster
children have an affirmative due process right to freedom from unreasonable harm), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 867 (1990); Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 794 (1lth Cir. 1987);
K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 849 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that a foster child has
a negative liberty interest against placement in an abusive foster home); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818
F.2d 791, 794 (11 th Cir. 1987) (holding that a foster child has the fight to be free of unreasonable
pain and has a fundamental right to custodial safety), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989).
9. Marisol A. v. Guiliani, 929 F. Supp. 662, 675 (1996).
10. Challenges to these bans could be based on state constitutions, many of which may
provide more explicit protection for the rights of children generally and orphans specifically than
does the U.S. Constitution. However, to ensure that the rights of orphans within the care and the
custody of the State receive universal protection, rather than on a jurisdiction by jurisdiction
basis, I am endeavoring to challenge the bans as violative of the Substantive and Procedural Due
Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.
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waiting children.11 Professor Barbara Woodhouse, who has done
substantial work in the area of adoption and as an advocate for
waiting children, asserts an affirmative fundamental constitutional
right to be adopted and argues that placement bans violate this
right.12  The argument for such a right has received considerable
attention and has been rejected in recent cases. 13 This article takes
no position as to the cogency of the argument that orphans have a
right to be adopted, nor does it reexamine the debate surrounding the
argument. Instead, the article contributes a complementary
argument, centered on orphans' negative liberty interest in freedom
from harmful state action, which may provide an additional basis for
a successful constitutional challenge to placement bans.
Part I of this article presents the factual context within which the
constitutionality of these bans arises. Data demonstrate a surplus of
children waiting to be adopted, the corresponding deficiency of
available adoptive parents, the impact of bans that operate to limit
the pool of prospective adoptive parents, the racialized realities of
the child welfare system, and the adverse consequences of extended
temporary and institutionalized care for orphans. This section
highlights the reality that for Black orphans, who are overrepresented
in the child welfare system and who face placement challenges, the
option is not placement with homosexuals or placement with
heterosexuals; rather it is placement or non-placement.
Part II of this article examines the substance of children's liberty
interests, as secured by the best interests of the child standard;
highlights permanency as best serving children's interests; and maps
the ways in which children's interests assume the force and quality
of rights in a variety of contexts. This section first emphasizes that a
11. The term "waiting children" is used to describe children for whom the state has assumed
legal and physical custody and who are available for adoption. Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 301.
12. "[T]he arguments in favor of a child's constitutional right to adoption may still be a
necessary prod to repeal existing or future bans. Therefore, in order to make my case for
adoption as a child's right, I will have to expand upon the arguments made unsuccessfully in
Lofton and more fully articulate the child's perspective .... If adoption is a fundamental right
then any law or policy that creates categorical barriers based on criteria such as the potential
adoptive parent's marital status, sexual orientation, age, religion, race, or ethnicity is
presumptively unconstitutional. Such laws must be given the same strict scrutiny and critical
examination of means and ends as other laws that place categorical burdens on entry into and
recognition of fundamental family relationships." Woodhouse, supra note 3, at 307, 321.
13. Lofton v. Kearney, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2001); Mullins v. Oregon, 57 F.3d 789,
794 (9th Cir. 1995); Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1437 (5th Cir. 1990); Lindley v.
Sullivan, 889 F.2d 124, 131 (7th Cir. 1989); In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 685 (Wis.
1994).
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child's rights are not extinguished by the state's exercise of its
parens patriae or police power, but rather, those rights direct and
limit the exercise of the state's authority to remove a child from its
parents. This section of the article then explores the scope and
content of the state's fiduciary duty to children within its care and
custody, which is informed by the best interests of the child standard,
and the extent to which orphans' liberty interests generate
enforceable protections against state action that forecloses, rather
than facilitates, permanent placement options.
Part III analyzes the constitutionality of orphan placement bans
within a substantive due process framework and in accordance with
the comparative harm calculus, used in the trans-racial adoption
context, which weighs the documented harms of extended temporary
and institutional care against the primacy of permanent placement
and an overwhelming amount of research confirming that orphans'
interests are served effectively in adoptive homes with gay and
lesbian parents. This section also explores the extent to which the
best interest of the child standard limits the ends a state is permitted
to pursue where it is acting qua parent and where it is acting qua
state. It further analyzes whether the state violates an orphan's
liberty interests when it forecloses a permanent placement option
without conducting an individualized assessment of the particular
needs of the child and the specific qualities of the available adoptive
home, as the best interests standard requires. 14
I. The Color of Child Welfare Realities
A. Changing the Frame Changing the Name
The relevant literature and case law refer to the categorical
placement bans at issue as "same-sex adoption bans" or "gay
adoption bans." In this article, however, they will be referred to as
orphan placement bans. The phrase "same-sex adoption bans"
highlights the impact of these bans on prospective adoptive parents.
14. In this article categorical bans that do not require an individualized review of an orphan's
needs, and the extent to which prospective adoptive parents can meet those needs, is analyzed
within the framework of substantive due process guarantees. In a future article I intend to address
whether the absence of an individualized review constitutes a deprivation of orphan's procedural
due process rights as well.
HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL
Emphasizing the rights of the individuals seeking to adopt, despite
the moral force of these objections, provides neither a politically
popular nor constitutionally successful strategy for challenging
placement restrictions. 15 The individual rights argument is
challenged by two legal realities: 1) courts have not recognized a
constitutional right to adopt;' 6  and 2) federal courts have not
interpreted the suspect class designation to include gay and lesbian
individuals. 17
The decision to use the term "orphan placement bans" in this
article is not merely a matter of semantics. 18 The term frames the
issue to emphasize that these bans limit permanent placement
opportunities for orphans of color, increasing their likelihood of
experiencing harms associated with extended temporary and
institutional care. This framing of the issue confronts the
characterization of these bans as child-saving measures. The use of
the term "orphan placement bans" is also consistent with the purpose
of this article, which is to advance child-centered constitutional
challenges to these restrictions and to establish pursuit of orphans'
best interests as a requirement of and a limitation on the state's
exercise of its parens patriae and police power. This article presents
a constitutional challenge rooted in an interpretation of the "best
interest of the child" standard. That interest secures certain liberty
interests and corresponding rights upon which orphan placement
bans unconstitutionally encroach. 19
15. See, Erica Gesing, Note, The Fight to be a Parent: How Courts Have Restricted the
Constitutionally-Based Challenges Available to Homosexuals, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 841, 847
(2004).
16. But see, Barbara Woodhouse, arguing that orphans should be considered to have a right to
be adopted. Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 307; Strasser, supra note 4, at 423.
17. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 818. But see, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 443 (2008)
(holding, "statutes imposing differential treatment on the basis of sexual orientation should be
viewed as constitutionally suspect under the California Constitution's equal protection clause").
18. See, Peter Loge, How to Talk Crimey and Influence People: Language and the Politics of
Criminal Justice Policy, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 693, 694 (2005) ("How an issue is perceived
determines the range of allies, advocates, opponents, and outcomes in debates around that issue.
These understandings are driven by language, such as what an issue is named, the metaphors
used, and the terms employed. The language frames an issue, which sets the political and policy
route the issue will follow. Well-selected language and frames can significantly increase the
chance for success in policy disputes, while poorly chosen words and frames can mean near-
certain failure. As such, political language and issue framing is hotly contested ground.").
19. Within an equal protection framework and in the child custody context, state action in
furtherance of a child's best interest has been recognized as "indisputably a substantial
governmental interest." Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). This characterization
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B. Placement Statistics
The constitutionality of orphan placement bans should be
analyzed within the context of child welfare realities. An
acontextual examination of these bans obscures the relevant best
interests of the child analysis, which requires a balancing of the
comparative harms and benefits of permanent placement versus non-
placement. The context is essential to the constitutional
determination of the legitimacy of the state's aim in enacting
20placement bans. The child welfare system is experiencing a crisis,
characterized by an increasing number of children flooding foster
care homes and state institutions, which is compounded by the
corresponding lack of potential parents available and willing to adopt
U.S. orphans. 21  Each year, the number of children entering the
foster care system exceeds the number of children who exit the
system. 22 On average, approximately 40 percent of the children
available for adoption are adopted annually, yielding a surplus of
waiting children that grows each year as additional children enter the
system. 23
According to the Williams Report, which provides a recent and
comprehensive compilation of research, data, and statistics on foster
and permanent care by gay and lesbian parents in the United
24 lebaStates, gay, lesbian and bisexual couples and individuals are
suggests strongly that the category of interests, however indeterminate, enjoys constitutional
protection, and state action that impairs these interests will be subject to a heightened scrutiny.
20. Implicit in the Supreme Court's holding in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) is the
instruction that the legitimacy of the state's aim under rational basis review should be determined
within the context of existing realities. The Court, holding that the proposed state constitutional
amendment prohibiting all legislative, executive, or judicial state action designed to protect
homosexuals was not rationally related to a legitimate state interest, explained, "its sheer breadth
is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by
anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state
interests." Id. at 632.
21. "If adoptive parents were waiting in line to adopt special needs children, the situation
might be less damaging. The sad truth is that there are far more children than homes (footnote
omitted)." Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 326; THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE REPORT, ADOPTION
AND FOSTER CARE BY GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (March 2007)
[hereinafter WILLIAMS REPORT] ("States seeking adoptive homes for children in foster care
report that one of the biggest obstacles is finding interested and able families to adopt").
22. AFCARS REPORT, supra note 3, at 1 ("Each year, the number of children entering care
has exceeded the number of children exiting care.").
23. Id. at 3. For the years 2000 to 2005 between approximately 38 percent and 46 percent of
children available for adoption were placed in adoptive homes.
24. WILLIAMS REPORT, supra note 21, at (unnumbered page on the first page of the
Executive Summary) (The Executive Summary explains the focus of the Report and the sources
HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL
raising 4 percent of adopted children 25 and caring for 3 percent of
foster children. 26 An estimated 9,000 to 14,000 waiting children
could be displaced annually from foster homes if categorical bans are
implemented nationally. 27  To be sure, the adverse impact of bans
that further limit the pool of available adoptive parents is not limited
to orphans of color. However, the overrepresentation of Black
children in the child welfare system, 28 the designation of special
29needs status for orphans based on their racial identity, the fact that
"gay and lesbian adults may be more willing to [adopt special needs
children] than heterosexual adults," 30 documented lower and slower
overall placement rates for Black orphans, 31  and the reality that
adopted children of heterosexual couples are 63 percent more likely
than children adopted by other family types to be white,32 render the
practical impact of these bans more harmful to Black orphans. As it
is, "[o]nce Black children enter the foster care system, they remain
there longer, are moved more often, and receive less desirable
placements than White children .... Black children tend to languish
in foster care."33 Limiting the pool of available adoptive homes, by
of information from which it derives the data contained therein, "this report provides new
information on GLB adoption and foster care from the U.S. Census 2000, the National Survey of
Family Growth (2002), and the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System.").
25.Id. at 11.
26. Id. at 15. "Accurate statistics regarding the number of parents who are gay or lesbian are
impossible to obtain. The secrecy resulting from the stigma still associated with homosexuality
has hampered even basic epidemiologic research. A broad estimate is that between 1 and 9
million children in the United States have at least I parent who is lesbian or gay." AMERICAN
ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS, No. 109-02 (2002), at 341-44. This statistic includes biological
parents while the statistics reported in the Williams report are focused on foster and adoptive
parents.
27. WILLIAMS REPORT, supra note 21, at (unnumbered page on the first page of the
Executive Summary).
28. The most recent statistical data, compiled by the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, is for fiscal year 2005 and reflects that 36 percent of waiting children were Black and 15
percent were Hispanic, despite the fact that in 2005 Blacks and Hispanics comprised 12.8 percent
and 14.4 percent of the total population, respectively. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NATIONAL
POPULATION ESTIMATES July 1, 2005. The report notes that, using U.S. Census Bureau's
standards, children of Hispanic origin may be of any race and that beginning in fiscal year 2000
children could be identified with more than one racial designation. Id. at 5.
29. Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 301.
30. Evan B. Donaldson Institute, EXPANDING RESOURCES FOR CHILDREN: LEGAL AND
PRACTICE BARRIERS 1, 5 (Sept. 2008) [hereinafter DONALDSON REPORT].
3 1. "Once Black children enter the foster care system, they remain there longer, are moved
more often and receive less desirable placements than white children." ROBERTS, supra note 5, at
19.
32. WILLIAMS REPORT, supra note 21, at 13.
33. Roberts, supra note 5, at 149.
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categorically prohibiting gay and lesbian couples and individuals
from adopting, means even fewer Black orphans will be permanently
placed.
C. Racial Disparities and Child Welfare
Creating and compounding the child welfare crisis are racial
disparities in the frequency and consistency of state involvement in
Black families, 34 the rate of and reasons for removal of children of
color from their homes, 35 and the evolution of state and federal
adoption legislation toward accelerating the termination of parental
rights. 36  These realities conspire to produce the disproportionately
high placement of Black children in state custody. Categorical
placement bans will condemn greater numbers of these children to
foster and institutionalized care - rendering them more vulnerable
to entering the juvenile justice and adult criminal justice systems,37
and to futures marked by homelessness and unemployment.
38
34. "[T]he foster care system in the nation's cities operates as an apartheid institution.
It is a system designed to deal with the problems of minority families - primarily black
families - whereas the problems of [W]hite families are handled by separate and less disruptive
mechanisms .... [I]t seems normal to many Americans that Black families are more often split
apart and supervised by the state." Id. at 10.
35. "Child protective agencies are far more likely to place Black children in foster care rather
than offering their families less traumatic assistance ... [algencies put Black children in out-of-
home custody at dramatically higher rates than other children. According to federal statistics,
56% of Black children in the child welfare system have been placed in foster care - twice the
percentage for white children (citation omitted). A national study of child protective services by
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services reported that 'minority children, and in
particular African-American children, are more likely to be in foster care placement than receive
in-home services, even when they have the same problems and characteristics as white
children."' Roberts, supra note 5, at 16 -17 (emphasis added).
36. Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 302-03. ("The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997
(citation omitted) requires state agencies to petition for termination of parental rights once a child
has been in state care for fifteen out of the last twenty-two months (citation omitted)"); Roberts,
supra note 5, at 149 ("Federal and state laws now place foster children on a 'fast track' to
adoption by imposing swifter timetables for severing their ties to their parents and by allowing
concurrent planning for adoption.").
37. See generally, Joseph P. Ryan, Pedro M. Hernandez, and Denise Herz, Developmental
Trajectories of Offending for Male Adolescents Leaving Foster Care, Social Work Research Vol.
31, No. 2, p. 83 (2007).
38. "In the face of a shortage of adoptive parents, categorical bans actually ensure that some
children will never have a family of their own .... [Mlany of these children will wait in vain
and will 'age out' of the system into homelessness and joblessness (footnote omitted). They 'will
never experience the love and support of a permanent family."' Woodhouse, supra note 1. at 326
(citation omitted); Existing racial disparities reflected in the "high-supply/low-demand" reality
of the child welfare system eerily mirror aspects of racial disparities in both juvenile justice and
criminal justice systems. See, Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass
HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL
The emphasis of this article on the "demand" aspect of the
challenges that plague the child welfare system, rather than on the
"supply" aspect, should not be interpreted as an exoneration of the
racialized processes and policies that result in disproportionate
numbers of Black children becoming orphans. To be sure, in the
absence of such a supply, the impact of placement bans would be far
less harmful, because they would impact far fewer children. Policies
and practices that result in more permanent placements for orphans
may relieve states of the pressure to reform the child welfare system
to ensure that fewer children enter the care and custody of the state. 39
Since the passage of the 1997 Adoption and Safe Families Act
("ASFA") 4° legislative calls for reform have emphasized securing
speedy and permanent placements for orphans and not on preventing
removal of children from their families. 41  The processes, policies,
and laws that result in the disproportionate disruption of Black
families and the consequential yield of increased numbers of Black
orphans are significant failings of the child welfare system. The
adverse impact of these deficiencies on Black orphans are
augmented by legislative bans that will bottleneck the placement
process, leaving thousands of Black children to languish in extended
foster and institutional care.42 This article does not ignore the reality
that the child welfare system continues to be sustained by a steady
Incarceration in African American, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1271, 1273 (2004) (observing "the
transformation of prison policy at the turn of the twenty-first century is most accurately
characterized as the mass incarceration of African Americans").
39. "[T]he plan to use adoption to cure the ills of foster care suffers from serious flaws. Its
most basic defect is that the adoption strategy will not accomplish its main objective to reduce
significantly the enormous foster care population. This is because the strategy includes
terminating more biological parents' rights, and not all of the 'legal orphans' produced will be
adopted. These numbers will be added to the long-term foster care caseloads. Even more
damaging is the adoption strategy's failure to address the child welfare system's most glaring
injustice - the racially biased removal of too many children from their homes. In fact, the new
emphasis on adoption only makes the system's racial disparity worse." Roberts, supra note 5, at
150.
40. The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89 ("[T]he Adoption and
Safe Families Act of 1997 created federal incentives to place children in permanent adoptive
homes) (footnote omitted).") Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 322.
41. Deborah Sanders, Toward Creating a Policy of Permanence for America's Disposable
Children: The Evolution of Federal Foster Care Funding Statutes from 1961 to Present, 29 J.
LEGIS. 51, 52 (2002).
42. "Because of the inadequate number of adoptive parents, even children who eventually
find homes with 'approved' adoptive parents may be harmed by unnecessary delays in placement
(footnote omitted). They may spend years in foster placements or other temporary care awaiting
adoption. The length of a child's stay in [foster] care has a significant negative impact upon the
child's psychological and social development." Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 326.
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supply of Black orphans; rather, it examines the constitutionality of
categorical placement bans in light of supply/demand realities and
the harmful impact of these bans on Black orphans.
Fourteen states and the District of Columbia specifically allow
gays and lesbians to adopt either by statute or judicial opinion.43
However, in spite of existing placement challenges and the surplus of
available children awaiting adoption, there has been a proliferation of
placement bans categorically prohibiting same-sex adoptions.44
Florida, which has the distinction of being the first state to prohibit
adoptions by same-sex couples and gay and lesbian individuals,
45
allows foster care placements with gays and lesbians. More
draconian bans, which would also prohibit gays and lesbians from
providing foster care, are being considered by legislatures in other
states. 46 The specific nature of placement bans vary considerably
among the states, 47 but all bans contract the already insufficient pool
43. These states include: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Illinois, Pennsylvania,
Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Vermont, Oregon and New Hampshire.
DONALDSON REPORT, supra note 30, at 19 n. 10.
44. Andrea Stone, Drives to Ban Gay Adoption Heat Up in 16 States, USA TODAY, Feb. 20,
2006, at A I ("republicans battered by questions over ethics and Iraq 'might well' use the adoption
issue to deflect attention and draw out conservatives in close Senate and governor races in states
such as Missouri and Ohio, says Sherry Bebitch Jeffe, University of Southern California political
scientist"); "As of February 2006, efforts were underway in at least sixteen states to enact bans on
adoption or to secure ballot initiatives or constitutional amendments barring adoption by
homosexuals." Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 306.
45. The Florida placement ban was enacted in 1977. Florida has proposed a change to its
adoption statute that will go into effect July 2008 which allows a homosexual to adopt a child if
the child's parents are deceased, the person proposing to adopt the child is the guardian of the
child, and includes certain other preconditions. The law will not apply retroactively. WILLIAMS
REPORT, supra note 21, at 3.
46. "Most children adopted from foster care are adopted by their foster parents, and banning
lesbian and gay adults from fostering will reduce the number of adoptive homes for children. No
state, as of this writing, expressly bars fostering by gay or lesbian parents by statute, but one state
does so through policy. Efforts to prevent fostering by gay and lesbian parents are ongoing,
leaving open the possibility that restrictions could be placed in the future." DONALDSON
REPORT, supra note 30, at 5; See e.g., Tracy Kasperek, Fostering to Children's Needs of
Fostering to Legislators' Agendas, 9 Scholar 313, 315-20 (2007) (describing unsuccessful efforts
in Texas in 1999, 2003 and 2005 to pass a bill prohibiting fostering by gays and lesbians).
47. "Claiming the promotion of the child's best interests paramount, courts and legislatures
have approached gay and lesbian adoption in a variety of ways." Strasser, supra note 8, at 110;
Mississippi bans same-gender couples from adopting but single gays, lesbians and bisexuals can
adopt. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3-(5); WILLIAMS REPORT, supra note 21, at 3; Utah prohibits
all unmarried cohabitating couples from adopting and fostering children. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
30-1(3)(b); WILLIAMS REPORT, supra note 21, at 3; Nebraska has a policy prohibiting gays,
lesbians and bisexuals from fostering children. WILLIAMS REPORT, supra note 21, at 3; Some
states have policies that either explicitly or implicitly state that sexual orientation cannot be a
basis for precluding adoption. Id.; States where restrictions are being drafted or considered
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of prospective adoptive parents, thereby committing greater
numbers of orphans to extended temporary and institutional care.
Even in the absence of legislation or a stated policy against foster
care and permanent placements with gay and lesbian couples and
individuals, there is significant evidence of de facto discrimination
against this demographic of prospective parents. 49  Existing and
proposed categorical placement bans do not mitigate the supply-
demand problem endemic to the child welfare system; rather, they
exacerbate the problem by further diminishing the shallow pool of
prospective parents and committing many more Black orphans to
extended temporary and institutional care.
D. The Harm of Extended Temporary and Institutional Care
As the data reflects, most children in foster care will not be
adopted, which means they will drift between foster homes or be
placed in a congregate care environment 50 until they age out of the
system. 5 1  Approximately 25 percent of foster children will live in
three or more foster homes 52 and will therefore be deprived of the
stable and secure home environments and sustained familial
relationships that permanent placement provides and that best serve
children's well-being. 53  The implementation of placement bans
include: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Vermont, and West Virginia. Id.
48. DONALDSON REPORT, supra note 30, at 6 (cautioning, "[s]tate laws excluding gay and
lesbian prospective adopters can negatively affect the pool of adoptive families for waiting
children .... [I]f ... efforts to restrict the rights of gays or lesbians to foster or adopt children
continue, the pool of prospective families for children in foster care could be significantly
reduced").
49. "The absence of an explicit policy does not mean that parents' sexual orientation is not
considered in adoption and foster care decisions." WILLIAMS REPORT, supra note 2 1, at 3.
50. Congregate care refers to group homes and state child care institutions (e.g., orphanages).
"[For example] 94,650 children (18 percent) in foster care were cared for in institutions or group
homes (citation omitted)." Id. at 1.
51. According to laws in most states, children "age out of the system" at eighteen years old.
Children can petition for emancipation in most states at age seventeen.
52. WILLIAMS REPORT, supra note 21, at 17 ("Studies show that the frequency of moves
between placements is associated with several harmful outcomes for children.").
53. David J. Herring, Inclusion of the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in the Termination of
Parental Rights Statutes: Punishing the Child for the Failures of the State Welfare System, 54 U.
PITT. L. REV. 139, 158 (1992) ("Each time a child is separated attachments may be broken
generating insecurity and an inability to form future attachments... and may permanently impair
a child's ability to form loving relationships. Subjecting children to multiple placements destroys
continuities that are important to a child's development ... a child left in foster care without a
permanent home may be psychologically damaged by her uncertain status.").
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contracts further the already limited pool of prospective adoptive
parents, rendering permanent placement an even more remote
possibility for many Black orphans.
54
The long-term social, educational, developmental and emotional
costs to children raised in foster and institutional care are well
documented.55 Studies report inferior outcomes for foster children
in the areas of educational performance, employment rates, income,
56and incarceration rates. For example, in Florida foster youth score
substantially lower on the Florida Comprehensive Achievement Test,
with fewer than 22% performing at grade level in reading and math;
are nearly twice as likely to have to repeat a grade in school; are five
times more likely to change schools; are more likely to be diagnosed
with learning disabilities; are twice as likely to have school
disciplinary problems that qualify them for dropout prevention
policies; and are more likely to experience teen homelessness.57
Foster youth in Florida are less likely to attend post-secondary
schools; typically earn only one-fourth the median wage of the same-
age population; are more likely to receive public assistance; and are
three times more likely to be in prison or on probation than are non-
foster care youth.58 While these statistics reflect realities specific to
the state of Florida, they represent a general trend of poorer
outcomes for foster, former foster and institutional care recipients in
54. "Special needs children ... suffer disproportionately from categorical bans to adoption.
Remember that special needs children include not only disabled and older children, but also
children of color." Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 327.
55. Michele Benedetto, An Ounce of Prevention: A Foster Youth's Substantive Due Process
Right to Proper Preparation for Emancipation, 9 U. C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL'Y 381 (2005)
(providing comprehensive data regarding outcomes for foster care youth across several
indicators); see also, WILLIAMS REPORT, supra note 21, at 17-18 (reporting negative outcomes
for foster youth moved between placements, foster youth in congregate care settings, and foster
youth who age out of the foster care system); DONALDSON REPORT, supra note 30, at II ("The
number of youths 'aging out,' in fact, has increased over the past five years (citation omitted).
While youths in the general population continue to rely on family long after they reach eighteen
(with over half of all 18 to 24 year olds continuing to live at home), those who have spent years
in foster care because they experienced abuse and neglect are expected to become independent
and self-sufficient in late adolescence. These youths, lacking permanent families to help them
transition into adulthood, are at heightened risk of negative outcomes: emotional adjustment
problems, poor educational results and employment prospects, and inadequate housing and
homelessness; furthermore, they are more likely to become involved with the criminal justice
system (citations omitted).").
56. Id.
57. OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY, IMPROVEMENTS
IN INDEPENDENT LIVING SERVICES WILL BETTER ASSIST STATE'S STRUGGLING YOUTH, FLA.
REPORT NO. 05-61, (2005) (OPPAGA REPORT NO. 05-61), at 4-5.
58. Id. at 6-7.
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areas related to and reflective of child development and well-being. 9
The implementation of placement bans nationwide will further
challenge the placement of difficult-to-place orphans in adoptive
homes and result in many more orphans experiencing the harmful
effects of extended foster and institutional care.
II. Discerning Orphans' Rights
A. Children's Liberty Interests
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that children are different
from adults and that these differences inform the character and extent
of the constitutional protection to which children are entitled.6 °
While the contours and content of children's constitutional rights
remain amorphous, it is clear that "neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone." 61 The Court
has stated that "[a] child, merely on account of his minority, is not
beyond the protection of the Constitution., 62  Furthermore,
"[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically
only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as
well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess
constitutional rights."
63
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects
fundamental liberty interests against state action. 64 This provision of
59. Benedetto, supra note 55, at 390; See also, DONALDSON REPORT, supra note 30.
60. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) ("We have recognized three reasons justifying
the conclusion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults: the
peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature
manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing"); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,
591 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T]here are differences which must be accommodated in
determining the rights and duties of children as compared with those of adults. Examples of this
distinction abound in our law: in contracts, torts, in criminal law and procedure, in criminal
sanctions and rehabilitation, and in the right to vote and to hold office.").
61. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 633.
62. Id.
63. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) ("[M]inors
as well as adults are protected by the Constitution and possess Constitutional rights").
64. In the Supreme Court's first interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause, The Slaughterhouse Cases, the majority rejected any concept of substantive due process.
The Court's reticence subsequently ended and its decision in Lochner v. New York signaled the
emergence of the substantive due process as a source of protection for economic and property
interests. The interpretation of the clause as providing protection exclusively to economic
interests has evolved into an interpretation of the protective scope of the clause to include non-
economic personal interests that are determined to encompass and reflect fundamental values.
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the U.S. Constitution announces that no state shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
65
The Supreme Court has stated that "[d]ue process of law is the
primary and indispensable foundation of individual freedom. It is
the basic and essential term in the social compact which defines the
rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the state may
exercise. ' ' 66  The Clause offers two distinct types of constitutional
protection against state impairment of the rights generated by the
liberty interests described in its text. 67 It is concerned both with the
methods and substance of state action.6 8  The Clause provides
substantive due process protection by circumscribing states'
substantive power to regulate certain inviolable areas of the human
experience (i.e., those which embody life, liberty and property
interests), and it provides procedural due process protection by
requiring that states adhere to fair procedural processes when
Post-Lochner applications of substantive due process, beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut,
reflect this trend. See e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) ("[The] law affords
constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, child rearing, and education. 'These matters, involving the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment (citation omitted)"');
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992); Michael
H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Constitutional interpretation of the Substantive Due
Process Clause has been and continues to be a challenging and controversial enterprise. See e.g.,
Id. at 136-37 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting the lack of agreement on the proper
methodology for analyzing substantive due process issues).
65. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
66. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 20 (1967).
67. "[It] is tempting, as a means of curbing the discretion of federal judges, to suppose that
liberty encompasses no more than those rights already guaranteed to the individual against federal
interference by the express provisions of the first eight amendments. But of course this Court has
never accepted that view... Casey, 505 U.S. at 847. The Clause does not identify the rights it
protects, rather it describes the liberty interests that generate the rights that fall within its
protective scope, and leaves to the Court the authority to identify those rights that fundamentally
reflect liberty interests in life, liberty and property.
68. Substantive due process, unlike procedural due process, does not condition government
restraint on procedural prerequisites. It is concerned rather with providing protection of state
infringement of certain venerable substantive rights without regard to the process by which the
state effectuates deprivation of those rights. "[I]t is settled that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure.
Thus all fundamental rights comprised within the term liberty are protected by the Federal
Constitution from invasion by the States." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927)
(concurring opinion); see also James Kainen, The Historical Framework for Reviving
Constitutional Protection for Property and Contracts Rights, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 87, 123
(1993) (noting the due process clause "prohibit[s], regardless of the matter of procedure, a certain
kind and degree of exertion of legislative power altogether").
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depriving persons of certain liberty interests. 69  The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment operates to prevent
government "from abusing [its] power, or employing it as an
instrument of oppression.
' 70
The first step toward challenging orphan placement bans on
substantive due process grounds is to identify the relevant liberty
interests and the corresponding rights that allow for the enforcement
of these interests.71  Courts have recognized that children within the
care and custody of the state have a liberty interest in freedom from
harmful state action.72 The question remains whether this liberty
interest provides protection against the harm orphans experience
when the state categorically bans permanent placement options
thereby depriving orphans of the care that best serves their interests.
Children's negative claim to freedom from harm, whether caused
by the parent or by the state acting as parent, derives from the best
interests of the child standard, which serves as the primary vehicle
for the expression and protection of children's interests and rights. 
73
This liberty interest is also a corollary to the state's fiduciary duty of
care for those within its custody.74 The best interests standard
69. "Although a literal reading [of the Due Process Clause] might suggest that it governs only
the procedures by which a State may deprive persons of liberty, for at least 105 years . . .the
Clause has been understood to contain a substantive component as well, one 'barring certain
government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them."' Casey,
505 U.S. at 846 (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).
70. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986).
71. "'Substantive due process' analysis must begin with a careful description of the asserted
right." Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).
72. See, e.g., K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 849 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that
a foster child has a negative liberty interest not to be placed in an abusive foster home); Meador v.
Cabinet for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474, 476 (6th Cir. 1990) cert. denied, 498 U.S. 867 (1990)
(holding that children in state-regulated foster care have an affirmative due process right to be
free from the infliction of unnecessary harm); Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791,
794 (1 1th Cir. 1987) cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989) (holding that an involuntarily placed
foster child has the right to be free of unnecessary pain and has a fundamental right to safety in
custody); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319 (1982).
73. "The 'best interests of the child,' while a term of art, is fairly self-explanatory. The
principle has been defined as the 'standard by which a court determines what arrangements would
be to a child's greatest benefit' (citation omitted). In other words, in custody disputes, the court
decides which placement would most benefit the child and adopts that course of action. A host of
factors are sometimes cited by courts trying to determine the best interests of a child. This
approach typically requires an examination of factors relating to a child's safety, happiness, and
physical, mental, and moral welfare (citation omitted)." Kevin Frankel, The Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Right to Family Integrity Applied to Custody Cases Involving Extended
Family Members, 40 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 301, 305 (2007).
74. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 319, DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Soc. Servs. Dept. would appear
to be a potential impediment to any constitutional challenge based on children's negative claim to
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should be understood as a sword the state may wield to enforce the
interests of children against parental abuse and neglect and as a
shield protecting children from harmful state action. In the adoption
context, children's liberty interests should protect them against state
action that limits or forecloses permanent placement, without
conducting an individual review to determine whether an available
placement serves the best interests of the child.75
B. Reading the Best Interests of the Child as Prioritizing
Permanency
Courts have relied on the best interests of the child standard, an
often cited but indeterminate category of interests, to outline and
color in the substance of children's entitlements and protections.76
The best interests standard generally encompasses that which serves
a child's physical, intellectual, moral and emotional well-being. 77 It
is the controlling standard in custodial and adoption decisions. 78  In
the adoption context, despite the generalized aspiration of the
freedom from harm. Upon close inspection, however, that impediment does not exist. Chief
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion rejects the notion that a State's failure to act to protect a son
from injury by an abusive father did not violate the child's Fourteenth Amendment rights.
DeShaney recognizes that the duty imposed by the Due Process Clause is not to protect the
interests of citizens against invasion by private actors; rather, it establishes a limitation on state
action. The purpose of the Clause is to protect people from the state, not from each other. While
under his father's care, Joshua DeShaney was owed no special protection from his father's abuse
by the State even though it was aware of the abuse. Those within the care and custody of the
state, however, are owed an affirmative duty of care and protection that may be conceptualized as
a federally recognized constitutional negative claim to freedom from harm.
75. Placement bans, like the Florida law, "foreclose[ ] the determinative issues of competence
and care, when it explicitly disdains present realities in deference to past formalities[;] it
needlessly risks running roughshod over the important interests of both parent and child'
(quotation omitted) .... [E]very child deserves an individualized assessment of his or her best
interests." Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 327.
76. Reno, 507 U.S. at 304 (examining the limitations of the standard); Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57, 84 n.5 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting state reliance on the best interests of
the child standard throughout its child related statutes); Frankel, supra note 75, at 305 (explaining
"[b]ecause factors vary by jurisdiction, it is difficult to articulate what exactly comprises the best
interests test").
77. Frankel, supra note 73, at 305.
78. "When courts become involved in custody and visitation issues, 'simplistic analysis and
the strict application of absolute legal principles should be avoided' (citation omitted). One must
remember that the best interests of the child are at stake and, further, that the 'governing criterion,
as always, is the best interests of the child."' Strasser, supra note 7, at 109; Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) ("Whatever might be required in other situations, we cannot say that the
State was required in this situation to find anything more than that the adoption... [was] in the
'best interests of the child."').
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standard and the inconsistency that often characterizes best interests
determinations, the application of the standard requires a fact-
specific, individualized inquiry into the specific needs of the child,
and whether the available adoptive home can satisfy those needs.79
Once a child is legally available for adoption, the public or private
agency facilitating the adoption conducts an evaluation of the
prospective parents and the home within which the child would live
to determine whether placement would serve the child's best
interests. While state statutes vary in terms of which considerations
are relevant to the determination of parental fitness and the
appropriateness of the placement, the best interests of the child
standard uniformly guides placement determinations.'s What is
common to all state evaluative processes is that the best interests
determination is a fact-specific, not a generalized, assessment.
8
'
In the adoption context, permanent placement enjoys primacy
status because it best serves the interests of waiting childrenYs2 Both
state and federal laws identify adoption as the primary placement
option for children for whom reunification with their parents is not
79. Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 327.
80. "Family law cases are notoriously fact-sensitive. Most legal questions involving
children's or parental rights are answered on a case-by-case manner and leave individual judges
'unusual discretion.' In fact, parental autonomy and the best interests of the child are two of the
few legal rules in this area of law, and neither is exactly seen as a model of clarity or
consistency." James A. Cosby, Stronger Rights for Parents and Some Affirmative Rights for
Children? No Problem: Changing How We Look at the Family, 6 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM.
ADVOC. 291, 294 (2007).
81. "Even if there was no statute excluding gays, lesbians, and bisexuals from adopting, there
would still be individualized hearings to determine whether that adoption would indeed promote
the best interests of the child (citation omitted). The only individuals whom [a] statute would
prohibit from adopting would be those whom the individualized hearings found would in fact
promote the best interests of the child." Strasser, supra note 7, at 78.
82. "As we pointed out in our Lofton brief, experts have concluded that adopted children
function more adequately at the personal, social, and economic level compared with those who
were formerly fostered and, particularly, those who grew up for a large part of their lives in
institutions ... adoption facilitates the development of an attachment relationship - a reciprocal,
enduring, emotional, and physical affiliation between a child and a caregiver. Attachment
relationships form the cornerstone for healthy psychological adjustment, affecting development
not only in infancy and childhood but in adulthood as well (footnote omitted). Because adoption
provides security and stability for the child, it is the placement option most likely to foster strong
attachment relationships for children whose biological parents are unavailable and unable to care
for them. The alternatives to adoption, even permanent placement guardianship, are less secure
than adoption and place children at risk of multiple placements. 'Multiple placements mean
multiple caregivers and can prevent a child from forming a lasting attachment to a nurturing,
caring adult' (footnote omitted). In addition to lacking the stability of adoption, foster care and
legal guardianship do not- as the Court of Appeals in Lofton recognized - have 'the societal,
cultural, and legal significance [of] . . . adoptive parenthood, which is the legal equivalent of
natural parenthood' (footnote omitted)." Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 323-24.
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possible. 83 Permanent placement provides the stability, security and
family structure that is necessary for the healthy development of a
child. 84  It has been noted that "[a] stable, loving home life is
essential to a child's physical, emotional, and spiritual well-being. It
requires no citation of authority to assert that children who are
abused in their youth generally face extraordinary problems
developing into responsible or productive citizens. The same can be
said of children, who, though not physically or emotionally abused
are passed from one foster home to another with no constancy of
love, trust or discipline." 85  Accordingly, "[t]he length of a child's
stay in [foster] care has a significant impact upon the child's
psychological and social development. The longer a child remains in
foster care, the greater the likelihood the child's attachment
relationships will be qualitatively inferior and, hence, that any
psychological or social problems will be irreversible."
' 86
Permanency can be achieved through reunification (i.e., returning
a child to her biological parents) or adoption. Federal legislation,
seeking to address child welfare failings within the control and
authority of states, has consistently identified adoption as serving the
best interests of foster children, for whom reunification is not
possible, and conditioned receipt of federal funds upon demonstrated
efforts by states to that end. 87  ASFA,8 8 which provides the existing
83. Id. at 322.
84. Encouraging Adoption: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the
Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. 112 (1997) ("Permanency has a variety of connotations
including notions of stability with respect to the home where the child lives and his or her
relationship to caregivers. In the strictest sense, however, permanency refers to the place where
the legal relationship between the child and the caregiver is the most secure.").
85. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 789 (1982) (Rehnquist. J., dissenting with O'Connor
C.J., Burger and White joining).
86. Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 326.
87. Sanders, supra note 41, at 52 ("[F]oster care funding laws have shifted the emphasis from
family preservation to child safety with the intention of assuring permanency for children with the
understanding that such a shift may mean giving up on parents. Despite the change in emphasis
from preservation to child safety, the goal of permanence in foster care, whether through
reunification efforts or more timely adoptions, has endured and continues to take shape as we
become aware of the needs of children in general and the impact of these laws on children in
foster care (citation omitted)."). The first significant Congressional child welfare enactment, The
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 96 Stat. 500 (1980),
codified the prioritization of permanency over temporary care. Its emphasis, however, was to
secure permanency by preserving or reunifying the family home. ASFA, which was devised to
respond to the failings of the 1980 Act, was also committed to the primacy of permanent
placement, but its focus was, as the title of the Act informs, achieving permanency through
adoption.
88. See Sanders, supra note 41.
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federal framework for state child welfare policies and practices,
identifies the child's health and safety as paramount to family
preservation 89 and presents adoption as the most effective means of
mitigating the irreparable harm caused by extended stays in foster
care. To this end, when the state has found aggravating
circumstances, 90 ASFA requires states to conduct a "permanency
hearing" within thirty days of the separation of the child from her
parents, relieving the state of its obligation to make additional efforts
at reunification. 91 The purpose of the hearing is to present a plan for
securing permanent placement. ASFA also seeks to limit the amount
of time a child spends in foster care by directing states to move to
terminate parental rights after a child has been in foster care for
fifteen of twenty-two months. 92  Additionally, ASFA incentivizes
adoption by awarding states monetary bonuses for each adoption
above an established baseline. 93  Notwithstanding legitimate
criticisms of ASFA as contributing to the overrepresentation of
Black orphans in the child welfare system, 94 it is clear that ASFA
emphasizes and facilitates permanent placement and essentially
codifies the primacy of permanency.
Outside of the adoption context, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged the unitary family, which it identifies as the optimal
family unit, as providing the best environment for child-rearing. 95
Implicit in the acknowledgement of the primacy of the unitary family
89. "ASFA has not abandoned the family preservation model, but merely subordinated it to
child safety and permanency timeline goals." Id. at 75.
90. See generally, Shawn R. McCarver, Termination of Parental Rights in Missouri Part 2:
Recent Court Decisions Arguably Make Terminations More Difficult, 62 J. Mo. B. 138 (2006)
(describing AFSA termination requirements).
91,42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 673b(d)(1).
94. "The federal law's accelerated deadlines for termination of parental rights will probably
increase the population of 'legal orphans.' There will be more parentless children stuck in foster
care without any legal ties to a family. Federal adoption incentives, on the other hand, even if
they achieve congressional goals, will fail to provide enough homes for these children. This
shortfall is exacerbated by the fact that the children most likely to be affected by the expedited
termination process are the very ones least likely to be adopted - Black children. Black parents'
rights are already terminated sooner than those of white parents, yet Black children are less likely
than white children to be adopted. This is why most of the children waiting to be adopted are
Black." ROBERTS, supra note 5, at 159.
95. Santosky v. Kramer 455 U.S. 745, 747 (1982); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,
136-37 n.5 ("The family unit accorded traditional respect in our society, which we have referred
to as the 'unitary family,' is typified, of course, by the marital family, but also includes the
household of unmarried parents and their children").
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is an acknowledgement of the permanency, stability, structure, and
security, inherent to that familial unit, as qualities that serve
children's best interests. 96  Permanency is identified as a key
characteristic of both the unitary and adoptive family 97 and as
serving the developmental needs and well-being of children.
Therefore, the best interests of the child standard should be
interpreted as securing children's interests in permanency and the
stability and security it provides.
Liberty interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause,
like the best interests of the child, are concerned with certain aspects
of the human experience that are so intrinsic to essential freedoms
that they enjoy protection against government infringement. 98 "The
Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the family ....
The integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Ninth Amendment." 99
The liberty interests inherent to the family construct should be read
to reflect and encompass the interests of all family members, parents
96. See generally, Elizabeth Scott & Robert Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA.
L. REV. 1225, 1324-25 (1998) (observing "the importance of stability and continuity of
caregiving relationships for children's welfare").
97. "Foster care and guardianship have neither the permanence nor the societal, cultural, and
legal significance [of] . . . adoptive parenthood, which is the legal equivalent of natural
parenthood." Lofion v. Kearney, 358 F.3d 804, 824 (1 1th Cir. 2001).
98. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (Justice McReynolds, over a vigorous
dissent authored by Justice Holmes, announced a reading of liberty as denoting "not merely
freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contact, to engage in any of
the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, to establish a home and
bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally
to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.").
99. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); The family unit, its attributes, and its
attendant relationships have enjoyed perpetual and substantial constitutional protection against
government infringement. The family unit is a sphere of personal conduct which has been
traditionally determined to constitute an aspect of liberty, within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause. "[It] is settled now ... that the Constitution places limits on a State's right to interfere
with a person's most basic decisions about family and parenthood... " Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992). "[The] Court has consistently protected traditional familial
institutions [against] the centrifugal forces of an anomie modem society."; Thomas C. Grey, Eros,
Civilization and the Burger Court, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 90 (1980); See also, Troxel
v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 78 (2000); Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753 (referencing the "Court's
historical recognition that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental
liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment (citations omitted)"); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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and children alike. 100 In the life of a child, the stability and security
that permanency provides in both the adoptive and unitary family
contexts is intrinsic to the child's human experience' 0 1 and should be
counted among the "privileges long recognized at common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."'10 2  If
essential aspects of care such as permanency and its attributes (i.e.,
the physical, mental, and emotional development and the health and
well-being of children) are determined not to constitute due process
liberty interests, one could argue that children possess no meaningful
protected interests that fall within the protective scope of the Due
Process Clause. This conclusion would be inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's acknowledgment that children do, in fact, possess
enforceable constitutional rights 1°3 and that "[t]he State ... has a
duty of the highest order to protect the interests of minor
children .. .,, 104
C. Mapping Children's Interests
The scope and substance of children's liberty interests inform the
scope of the state's fiduciary duty to provide a certain measure of
care to children within its care and custody.'°5 The extent to which
these liberty interests operate as a restraint on the state's exercise of
its parens patriae authority depends upon whether and against whom
children's interests are enforceable. 1°6  In certain contexts, children
clearly possess "the normative power to determine the duties of
others"' 1 7 to act in furtherance of their interests - an authority mere
100. James A. Cosby, Re-examining the Parent-Child-State Relationship, I 1 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 723, 725 (2002) ("In granting any form of strong and affirmative legal rights to
children, the authority of parents and indeed the entire structure of the family itself is placed in
jeopardy. Without the structure of family, a child obviously has very little hope in life. If
parental autonomy were to be defined so that the actual well-being of the child was not
acknowledged, the entire purpose for the family in the first place would be lost.").
101. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 789.
102. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
103. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634-35 (1979) (The Court cites several areas of law
where it has recognized and protected the interests of children against unconstitutional
government infringement).
104. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
105. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319 (1982) ("The basic requirement of adequacy,
in terms more familiar to courts, may be stated as that training which is reasonable in light of
identifiable liberty interests and the circumstances of the case.").
106. Cosby, supra note 100, at 725.
107. Katherine Federle, Empowerment Rights, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1585, 1591 (1995).
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privileges generally do not afford. The power to enforce the
provision of children's interests and the punitive character of the
consequences of violating their liberty interests evince the existence
of rights that assure the realization and protection of that which
serves their best interests.
Parental breach of the duty to serve and safeguard the best
interests of children can result in the termination of parental rights
and the disruption of the family unit, both of which involve
established fundamental rights and enjoy considerable constitutional
protection. 10 8  Parents enjoy more specified liberties than children
do; 109 however, the substantial constitutional protection afforded the
exercise of parental power within the family unit and over the care
and rearing of their children is not absolute. "Notions of parental
authority and family autonomy cannot stand as absolute and
invariable barriers to the assertion of constitutional rights by
children." 110
The fact that parental misconduct that infringes a child's best
interest can result in the termination of a constitutionally revered
relationship (i.e., the parent-child relationship) and constitutionally
protected rights attendant to that relationship (i.e., the right to
construct a family and freedom of action within that family unit)
confirms the enforceability of the child's liberty interests in that
which best serves her development and well-being. The Supreme
Court's characterization of state action in furtherance of these
interests as an "indisputably. . . substantial governmental interest" 11
108. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 631 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
109. Parents have protected liberty interests in the creation and definition of a family; in the
parent-child relationship; and in rearing their children as they see fit. Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
491 U.S. 110 (1989); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) ("[The] Constitution
prevents East Cleveland from standardizing its children - and its adults - by forcing all to live
in certain narrowly defined family patterns."); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) ("It
is not surprising that the decision to marry has been placed on the same level of importance as
decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child-rearing, and family relationships. [It] would
make little sense to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and
not with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our
society."); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)
(referencing the "Court's historical recognition that freedom of personal choice in matters of
family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment (citations
omitted)"); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57
(2000).
110. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
111. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
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allows the state to infringe fundamental parental rights in pursuit of a
child's best interests. An examination of the various contexts within
which children's liberty interests operate, and how they define and
limit intersecting rights, reveals the extent to which children's
interests assume the force, quality, and functional character of
enforceable rights.
D. Reading Children's Liberties in Context
Much case law reflects the relatively diminished quality and
character of the constitutional rights and protections accorded
children, " 2 and courts have often acknowledged that children have
comparatively fewer constitutional rights and protections than
adults. 113  It cannot be said, however, that children have no
appreciable constitutional rights or protections. 1 4  "The Court's
concern for the vulnerability of children is demonstrated in its
decisions dealing with minors' claims to constitutional protection
against deprivations of liberty or property interests by the State." 1
5
Defining the substance of children's liberty interests is
challenging because they are often discernible only in relationship to
corresponding and intersecting rights. Children's rights are context-
dependent, mercurial, and their substance is often eclipsed by
competing interests of others. To define the scope and content of
children's liberty interests, it becomes necessary to trace their
emergence, evolution, and operation in the following contexts and at
the following decision points: 1) in the intact family; 2) when the
112. "[E]ven where there is an invasion of protected freedoms 'the power of the state to
control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults .... '
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
170 (1944)).
113. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
114. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) ("[W]hatever may be their precise impact, neither the
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone."); Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 633 ("A
child, merely on account of his minority, is not beyond the protection of the Constitution");
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) ("Constitutional
rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of
majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional
rights"); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Rehnquist dissenting) ("[C]ases . . . have
clearly held that the children themselves have constitutionally protectable interests. These
children are 'persons' within the meaning of the Bill of Rights. We have so held over and over
again.").
115. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634-35 (The Court cites several areas of law where it has
recognized and protected the interests of children against unconstitutional government action).
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state intervenes on behalf of the child to assert her right to non-
abusive and non-neglectful care, and terminates the parent-child
relationship, bringing the child within its care and custody; and 3)
when the child is in foster or institutional care and the state is
responsible for making a placement decision.
E. Intact Family Context
In the intact family context it is difficult to distinguish clearly
between the rights of the child and the rights of the parent.116 In this
context, children's interests are presumed to be served by the
interests of the parent. 117 As a result, the best interests standard is
interpreted as providing a vicarious conception of children's interests
as ascertainable only in relation to the rights of their parents. To a
great extent, the right of parents to their relationship with their child
and their protected liberty interest in rearing that child free from state
interference eclipse any rights that the child has, making it difficult
to discern the child's individuated rights. 1' 8 It is important to note,
however, that though parental rights receive great constitutional
protection they are limited to some measurable extent by the best
interests of the child. 119
Though a child has no right or interest in a particular kind of care
as long as her best interests are served, she does possess an interest
in being free from care that constitutes abuse or neglect (i.e., care
that vitiates her best interests). 120  In the intact family, the best
interests standard can be said to operate passively, as a shield,
116. "[P]arent's and children's respective interests too often become enmeshed. Enmeshment
develops when overlapping interests make any determination as to what individual liberty
interests are even involved in a given case impossible. Where these most basic terms are unclear,
any attempts to effectuate parental rights or to protect children are ill- fated." Cosby, supra note
100, at 724.
117. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
118. "[R]elying on the same overly-broad rules of parental autonomy may well mean the
effective eclipsing of the most minimal interests of the child. If a court is not careful, a child will
no longer simply [be] subject to parental authority in such a case, but his or her interests will not
be accounted for in the analysis at all." Cosby, supra note 80, at 297.
119. "Potential conflict [between parental and children's rights] occurs, when a child is
granted an affirmative interest, where the state should interject its own version of the child's 'best
interest' into the family through the law .... [1]t is crucial to this analysis to understand that the
effective result in such cases is not only a right for the child but that the very scope of parental
authority itself is necessarily being limited and redefined in a more narrow fashion." Cosby,
supra note 100, at 726.
120. Cosby, supra note 80, at 296.
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protecting a child from parental conduct adverse to her best interests.
Despite parents' broad discretion in the rearing, management, and
care of their children and the substantial constitutional protection
accorded that discretion, parental conduct that disserves the child's
best interests provides grounds for the state's suspension or
termination of parental rights. 12 1  This is the case even when the
parental conduct that threatens the child's well-being falls within the
scope of constitutional protection. 22
Within the context of the intact family, the best interests
framework provides a standard for the quality of care to which a
child is entitled. Despite the substantial protection accorded parental
rights with respect to child rearing, the child's best interests operate
as a bulwark against conduct that impairs her emotional, physical,
and mental development and well-being. While a child has an
interest in care that does not abridge certain aspects of her well-
being, those interests do not require a particular kind of care, beyond
that which does not constitute abuse and neglect. In the absence of
abuse and neglect, it would be difficult to characterize children's
interests as enforceable; however, where abuse and neglect occur,
children's interests generate an enforceable liberty interest in
freedom from care inconsistent with their best interests. The fact
that the state is not obliged to enforce this liberty interest 23 does not
negate its existence.
F. Intervention and Termination Context
While a child's best interests can operate as a shield within the
context of an intact family, when the state does decide to intrude into
the sacred sphere of the family to protect a child against abuse and
neglect, the child's liberty interests begin to function as a sword -
121. "[BJecause children are totally vulnerable to all manner of abuse and neglect, there are
also circumstances where it is ... clear that a legal doctrine of the best interests of the child must
be invoked. If a parent is not meeting his or her 'high duty' to raise and protect a child, the state
has some authority to fill that role." Id.
122. Even though parental authority enjoys substantial constitutional protection, it is not
without limits when the exercise of that authority adversely impacts the child's health or well
being. In the medical context, where parental rights to the free exercise of their religious beliefs
and to the care and management of their child motivate a parent to withhold life saving medical
care from their child, "[t]he best interests standard validly overrides parental rights of control
whenever the welfare interest of the child is substantial." Tom L. Beauchamp, Methods and
Principles in Biomedical Ethics, 29 J. MED. ETHICS 269 (2003).
123. See supra note 76.
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facilitating the suspension and/or termination of parental rights.
124
This can only occur subsequent to an initial determination of parental
unfitness followed by the presentation of clear and convincing
evidence 125 that parental conduct has impaired a child's best
interests.126  A determination of parental unfitness and abuse and
neglect acts to differentiate children's and parental interests. 127 It is
at this decision point that the child's interests emerge from the
shadow of preponderant parental interests, shed their symbiotic
character, and establish themselves as enforceable interests.
Courts could use the state police power to justify interference
with family autonomy. This power affords plenary authority to
provide for the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of its
citizens. 128  Generally, however, courts invoke the state's parens
patriae authority, which is designed to protect individuals and to
uphold abuse and neglect legislation. 129  In the absence of a child's
124. "[T]he constitutional protection against arbitrary state interference with parental rights
should not be extended to prevent the States from protecting children against the arbitrary
exercise of parental authority that is not in fact motivated by an interest in the welfare of the
child." Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 89 (2000).
125. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (requiring state to meet a "clear and
convincing evidence" standard of proof in parental rights termination proceedings).
126. "Termination hearings ... in most other states today, (citation omitted) have two
distinct phases. In the first 'fact-finding' phase, the sole issue is whether the Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights of parents have been adequately protected throughout the
termination process (citation omitted). That is, 1) has the state done everything it can to ensure
the accuracy and severity of the allegations of abuse and/or neglect; and 2) has the state shown
that it has given the parents an adequate opportunity and assistance in its 'efforts to encourage
and strengthen the parental relationship' (citation omitted)? These protections of parents include
a long series of legal hurdles - over the course of years and including multiple court hearings -
all of which must be cleared before the state can begin an actual termination hearing. If the state
cannot meet its burden at the first phase of the termination hearing, the case ends and the status
quo is maintained for that family. The state may then begin to gather more evidence and possibly
re-institute a case in the future. The interests of the children are only to be addressed at the
second 'dispositional' stage of the termination hearing. (citation omitted) During this second
phase, it is determined if termination of the parental rights is actually in the 'best interests' of the
children or not (citation omitted). Thus, it is only if the state meets its burden of evidence at the
first stage that the interests of children are to be addressed (citation omitted)." Cosby, supra note
80, at 305.
127. "At the fact finding [to determine abuse or neglect], the State cannot presume that a
child and his parents are adversaries. After the State has established unfitness at that initial
proceeding, the court may assume at the dispositional stage that the interests of the child and the
natural parents do diverge (citation omitted). But until the State proves parental unfitness, the
child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural
relationship (footnote omitted). Thus, at the factfinding, the interests of the child and his natural
parents coincide to favor use of error-reducing procedures." Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760-61.
128. Ernest Gellhom, Developments, The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV.
1156, 1998-1999 (1980).
129. Id. at 1221.
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liberty interests, state invasion of the highly protected province of
the family and disruption of the parent-child relationship would be
an ultra vires exercise of the state's parens patriae authority.
130
Accordingly, the scope and substance of the state's parens patriae
power, 13 1 in this context, should be constrained by the purpose that
triggers its exercise - the protection and enforcement of the child's
best interests. 132  Additionally, the state's fiduciary duty to those
within its custody operates as a restraint on the state's exercise of its
parens patriae power. 1
33
The child's inability to assert her right to competent care does
not indicate that such a right does not exist; rather, age and
circumstances limit her capacity to enforce this right.' 3 4  As the
Supreme Court has observed, "[children] are always in some form of
custody. Children, by definition, are not assumed to have the
capacity to take care of themselves. They are assumed to be subject
to the control of their parents, and if parental control falters, the State
must play its part as parens patriae."'' 35 The state has the authority
to act in pursuit of its "compelling interest in protecting the physical
130. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 77-78 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that the
state cannot interfere simply "any time it thinks it can do better" than a parent); The State's
parens patriae power and the state's police power are often referenced interchangeably in this
context. See Joan C. Bohl, The "Unprecedented Intrusion ": A Survey And Analysis of Selected
Grandparent Visitation Cases, 49 OKLA. L. REV. 29, 69 (1996) (noting that the 'parens patriae
power and police power both provide the state with authority to act to protect children lacking the
guidance and protection of fit parents of their own, and although they may represent different
perspectives, both contemplate harm to the child and, in practical terms, have been used nearly
interchangeably in the fashioning of a threshold requirement of parental unfitness, harm, or
threatened harm. Since society vests child-rearing responsibility in parents, parents are the
children's protection from the forces and pressures of society around them" (footnote omitted)).
131. For a comprehensive discussion of the origins, history and evolution of the state's
parens patriae authority, see Aaron Zurek, All The King's Horses and All The King's Men. The
American Family After Troxel, the Parens Patriae Power of the State, a Mere Eggshell Against
the Fundamental Right of Parents to Arbitrate Custody Disputes, 27 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. &
POL'Y 357, 377-398 (2006).
132. Id. at 396-97 (noting, "The modem doctrine, in light of the preceding factors, allows the
state to act only under compelling, case specific circumstances (citation omitted). For the sake of
the child, the state must be allowed to enter the zone of familial privacy when the child has been
abandoned or awfully neglected (citation omitted)").
133. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982) ("When a person is
institutionalized-and wholly dependent on the State ... a duty to provide certain services and
care does exist... ").
134. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984).
135. Id. See also, The King, the Courts and 'Incompetent' Children: The Welfare Jurisdiction
of the Family Court of Australia, Parliamentary Library, (Nov. 16, 2004), available at
http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/m2004-05/05rn 7.pdf (Australia's Parliament described
parens patriae authority as "limited to supervising the exercise of parental responsibility and...
guided by the principle that the best interests of the child are paramount.").
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and psychological well-being of minors" 136 and to enforce a child's
liberty interest in freedom from incompetent parental care.' 37  The
state's vicarious assertion of the child's liberty interests, in
furtherance and protection of her best interests,1 38 confirms the
existence of the child's rights. These rights limit the scope and
breadth of parental rights 139 and justify invasion of the family unit
and state interference in the parent-child relationship.
G. Foster Care Context
When parental rights are terminated because of child abuse or
neglect, or surrendered by the natural parents, the state, pursuant to
its parens patriae authority, assumes legal and physical custody of
the child. The child becomes an orphan and is placed in a foster or
congregate care setting. If the child is placed in a state orphanage or
state operated group home the state has exclusive legal and physical
custody over the child. If, however, the child is placed in a foster
home, the state shares, but does not relinquish, physical and legal
custody with the foster parents. The state retains some degree of
legal and custodial responsibility for the child until she is
permanently placed in an adoptive home.
The child's liberty interests, which the state enforces over
parental rights when it facilitates the termination of the parent-child
relationship, do not dissipate once the child is placed within the
State's protective custody. These interests continue to operate to
ensure that the child's best interests are served. Moreover, the
136. Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
137. Keith Weins, State v. Parent Termination of Parental Rights: Contradictory Actions by
the Ohio Legislature and the Ohio Supreme Court in 1996, 26 CAP. U.L. REV. 673 ("A
proceeding to terminate parental rights in cases of abuse, neglect, or dependency must balance the
liberty interests of natural parents against the rights of the child to be free from harm from their
parents."); See also, Zurek, supra note 131, at 382 (noting, "[t]he United States Supreme Court
agreed that the parens patriae power must be limited to a remote supervisory function (citation
omitted) .... [T]hus, the modem American doctrine allows the state to act as 'parent' only when
the child's legal parents 'falter'(citation omitted)").
138. Zurek, supra note 131, at 386 (identifying the U.S. Constitution as the source of modem
constructions and understanding of the State's parens patriae power and describing it "as a
narrow state privilege to be implemented only in circumstances beneficial to the child and in full
consideration of the blessings endowed upon the parents").
139. "When the State initiates a parental rights termination proceeding, it seeks not merely to
infringe that fundamental liberty interest, but to end it." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759
(1982) (quoting Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (quoting Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
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child's best interests provide the sole justification for the state's
exercise of its parens patriae authority. In the foster care context,
the absence of competing and preponderant parental rights, such as
those at issue in the intact family context, should make the rights of
orphans easier to discern. While the state, like a natural parent, is
obliged to preserve and promote the best interests of a child, unlike a
natural parent, it has no distinct fundamental liberty interest inherent
in its relationship with the child. 140 Unlike the parent-child
relationship, the state-child relationship should not enjoy
constitutional protection. The state has no filial relationship with the
child for whom it has assumed legal and custodial responsibility.
Because there are no competing interests inherent to the state-child
relationship the best interests of the child should define the rights of
the child and the obligations of the state. Accordingly, the orphan's
liberty interests should provide the same measure of protection
against harmful state action as they did against harmful parental
conduct and ensure that she receives care that serves, promotes, and
protects her best interests.
Regardless of whether a child is under the care of her biological
parent or the state acting as parent, her liberty interests are equally
substantive and enforceable. When in the care and custody of the
state the orphan retains an enforceable liberty interest in freedom
from conduct that impairs her best interests. Since permanent
placement has been identified as the optimal setting for an orphan
because it best promotes and preserves her best interests, orphans
should be considered to possess an interest in being free from
government action that categorically forecloses the opportunity for
permanent placement, in favor of the less preferred (and more
harmful) option of extended institutional or foster care. 14 1
140. "The rule in favor of deference to parental authority is designed to shield parental
control of child rearing from state interference (citation omitted). The rule cannot be invoked in
defense of unfettered state control of child rearing or to immunize from review the decisions of
state social workers. The social worker-child relationship is not deserving of the special
protection and deference accorded to the parent-child relationship, and state officials acting in
loco parentis cannot be equated with parents." Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 637-38 (1979)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
141. Once a child is within the care and custody of the State and it is acting "[a]s parens
patriae, the State's goal is to provide the child with a permanent home." Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745, 747 (1982).
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H. The State's Fiduciary Duty within the Foster Care Context as
a Restraint on Its Parens patriae Authority
An orphan's negative right to be free from state placement action
that impairs her liberty interest in permanency is distinguishable
from the affirmative right to be placed in an adoptive home. 142 The
strong preference for adoption and the identification of the unitary
family as the optimal setting for child-rearing establish that orphans'
interests are best served by permanent placement. While the state
has a responsibility to seek permanent placements for each orphan, it
is not required to place orphans in permanent homes. An orphan's
interest in being permanently placed does not generate an
enforceable, affirmative right to be adopted, 143 but it should be
considered to generate a negative right to be free from categorical
placement bans that limit permanent placement options. Such bans
deprive orphans of the benefits of permanency which serve their best
interests and result in the most harmful placements for orphans. The
state has a fiduciary duty to children within its custody to protect
against infringement of their best interests 144 and a duty not to
facilitate infringement of their best interests.
The Supreme Court's opinion in DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dept. of Social Services, 145 which is instructive as to the state's
fiduciary duty to provide for the best interests of orphans, explicitly
rejects the existence of a state obligation to protect a child from
abuse and neglect by a private individual. 46  DeShaney does not,
142. Lofton v. Kearney, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (1lth Cir. 2001). Importantly, though the
Eleventh Circuit announced the absence of a right to be adopted, it cited no cases in support of
that proclamation.
143. One explanation of courts' reluctance to recognize a right to be adopted is that judges
consider it to be a corollary to the absence of a right to adopt. "A number of courts, like the
federal courts in Lofton, have treated children's rights in adoption as the mirror image of adults'
rights - or lack thereof (footnote omitted). Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that adults
have no right to adopt, does it necessarily follow that children have no right to be adopted?"
Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 319-320; see Lindley v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 124, 133 (7th Cir. 1989)
(comparing the compelling character of the right to adopt and the right to be adopted but finding
neither to qualify as a fundamental interest the court observes, "if anything, the child's interest in
being adopted may be more compelling than the interest of potential parents in adopting. State
adoption proceedings center upon the best interest of the child, not the desires, however intense,
of potential parents to add to their family by adoption").
144. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319 (1982).
145. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Soc. Servs. Dept., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
146. "As a general matter ... we conclude that a State's failure to protect an individual
against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause." Id. at
197.
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however, foreclose the argument that once a state has exercised its
parens patriae authority to remove a child whose best interests are
infringed by his parents, it is obliged to continue to act in furtherance
of the child's best interests.
The facts of DeShaney provide a context for its holding, which
supplies implicit support for an orphan-centered, substantive due
process challenge to placement bans. Several individuals reported to
the Winnebago County Department of Social Services ("DSS") that
Joshua DeShaney was being physically abused by his father. After
his father's abuse landed Joshua in the hospital, DSS obtained a
court order allowing the hospital to exercise temporary custody over
Joshua. However, after an investigation, DSS determined that there
were no grounds upon which to retain custody over Joshua, and he
was returned to his father's home. Despite subsequent incidents that
raised the suspicions of the case worker - including another
hospitalization believed to have been caused by abuse - Joshua
remained in his father's care and custody. The lawsuit at issue arose
after Joshua received a beating at the hands of his father that caused
severe brain damage and rendered Joshua permanently and
profoundly retarded.
Joshua's mother, who initiated the lawsuit on her son's behalf,
charged that the state's failure to take permanent custody of Joshua
(i.e., failure to act) constituted an unconstitutional deprivation of his
substantive due process liberty interests. 147  Addressing Joshua's
claim that the state was categorically obliged to protect him, the
Court explained the scope of Due Process protection:
[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself
requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of
its citizens against invasion by private actors .... As we
have said. . . '[a]lthough the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause affords protection against unwarranted
government interference ... it does not confer an entitlement
to such [governmental aid] as may be necessary to realize all
the advantages of that freedom. 148
147. "The complaint alleged that respondents had deprived Joshua of his liberty without due
process of law, in violation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, by failing to intervene
to protect him against a risk of violence at his father's hands of which they knew or should have
known." DeShaney, 489 U.S. at. 193.
148. Id. at 195-196 (citation omitted).
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The Court held that Joshua suffered no due process violation. 149
The DeShaney opinion clearly forecloses an argument that the
state has an affirmative duty to protect a child within the care and
custody of a private actor, but leaves open the question of whether
the state owes a fiduciary duty to children, like orphans, entrusted to
its custody and care. 150 The Court acknowledged,
[I]n certain limited circumstances the
Constitution imposes upon the State affirmative duties
of care and protection with respect to particular
individuals.... When the State takes a person into its
custody and holds him there against his will, the
Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to
assume some responsibility for his safety and general
well-being (citation omitted) .... The rationale for
this principle is simple enough: when the State by the
affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an
individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care
for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for
his basic human needs - e.g., food, clothing, shelter,
medical care, and reasonable safety - it transgresses
the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause (citations
omitted).... The affirmative duty to protect arises
not from the State's knowledge of the individual's
predicament or from its expressions of intent to help
him, but from the limitation which it has imposed on
his freedom to act on his own behalf (citation
omitted).... In the substantive due process analysis,
it is the State's affirmative act of restraining the
individual's freedom to act on his own behalf -
through incarceration, institutionalization, or other
similar restrain of personal liberty - which is the
149. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 202 (The Court held, "the State had no constitutional duty to
protect Joshua against his father's violence, [and] its failure to do so - though calamitous in
hindsight - simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause (footnote
omitted).").
150. Id. at 196.
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'deprivation of liberty' trigering the protection of the
Due Process Clause....
Importantly, the Court addressed the following contingency:
"[h]ad the State by the affirmative exercise of its power removed
Joshua from the free society and placed him in a foster home
operated by its agents, we might have a situation sufficiently
analogous to incarceration or institutionalization to give rise to an
affirmative duty to protect."' 52 The situation that the Court declined
to address in DeShaney, which triggers due process protections, is
precisely the circumstance within which orphans find themselves.
The assumption of legal and physical custody of a child is a
constitutional predicate for a fiduciary obligation by the state to
provide for the child's best interests. By exercise of its parens
patriae authority, the state deprives the child of her personal liberty
insofar as it enforces her right to minimally competent care by
separating her from her parents because their neglectful or abusive
conduct has violated her interests. Upon placement of the child in
state custody, the state has the exclusive authority to make one of
two placement decisions: It can provide temporary care (i.e.,
institutional or foster care), or it can secure permanent placement in
an adoptive home if one is available. The orphan does not have the
ability to facilitate either kind of placement. The orphan's
circumstance, like the one to which the DeShaney Court alluded,
creates "a situation sufficiently analogous to ... institutionalization
to give rise to an affirmative duty to protect."' 153 The duty arises
"from the limitation which [the State] has imposed on [the orphan's]
freedom to act on his own behalf.' 154  Courts have interpreted
DeShaney as acknowledging a state fiduciary duty by virtue of a
special relationship between the state and those confined to its
151. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200.
152. Id. at 201 n.9 (The court stated, "Indeed, several Courts of Appeals have held, by
analogy to Estelle and Youngberg, that the State may be held liable under the Due Process Clause
for failing to protect children in foster homes from mistreatment at the hands of their foster
parents (citations omitted) .... [W]e express no view on the validity of this analogy, however, as
it is not before us in the present case.").
153. Id. at 201 n.9.
154. Id. at 200.
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custody, 155 as well as by virtue of affirmative action by the state that
exposes those within its care and custody to danger or harm. 156
I. Special Relationship Basis for State's Fiduciary Duty
DeShaney accommodates an argument that the state, as parens
patriae, owes a duty of care to its orphaned charges, and Youngberg
v. Romeo157 provides a basis for determining the scope and substance
of that duty. In Youngberg, the Supreme Court agreed with the view
expressed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals that the liberty
interests of an involuntarily committed mentally retarded man
imposed upon the state a fiduciary obligation to provide minimally
adequate care and treatment "to ensure safety and freedom from
undue restraint."' 158  The Court explained, "When a person is
institutionalized and wholly dependent on the state, a duty to provide
certain services and care does exist, although even then a state
necessarily has considerable discretion in determining the nature and
scope of its responsibilities."' 159  The Court instructed that the
adequacy determination be a particularized one made in light of
"identifiable liberty interests and the circumstances of the case,"'160
and emphasized, "because the facts in cases of confinement of
mentally retarded patients vary widely, it is essential to focus on the
facts and circumstances of the case before a court."' 16 1  In
determining the reasonableness of the quality of care to be provided,
"courts must show deference to the judgment exercised by a
155. See generally, Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97 (1976).
156. D.R. v. Middlebrooks Area Vocational Tech., 972 F.2d 1364, 1373 (3d. Cir. 1992) ("the
state-created danger theory, utilized to find a constitutional tort duty under § 1983 outside of a
strictly custodial context, has been recognized by several courts of appeals (citation omitted)
(citing Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348 (11 th Cir. 1989)); Wood v. Ostrander,
879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 341 (1990); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715
F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1983)).
157. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 307.
158. Id. at 319 ("Chief Judge Seitz did not identify or otherwise define - beyond the right to
reasonable safety and freedom from physical restraint - 'the minimally adequate care and
treatment' that appropriately may be required for this respondent (footnote omitted) ... we ...
conclude that respondent's liberty interests require the State to provide minimally adequate or
reasonable training to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint.").
159. Id. at 317.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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qualified professional"' 162  and "the decision, if made by a
professional ... is presumptively valid."1
63
Youngberg provides a formula for analyzing the provision of
adequate care by the state to those confined to its custody. It
identifies state confinement as a constitutional predicate for a duty of
care and identifies safety and freedom from undue restraint as
aspects of the state's duty to one within its custody and care.' 64 The
liberty interest of the state's charge exists by virtue of her
confinement, 165 informs the substance and content of the state's duty
of care, 166 and is defined by her specific needs.' 67  The Court's
acknowledgement that the confined person's liberty interest requires
the state to provide care sufficient to ensure safety and freedom from
undue restraint, implicitly imposes a duty upon the state to select the
least restrictive and least harmful care for orphans. In Youngberg,
the Court emphasized that adequacy of care is an individualized
determination based upon the specific factual circumstances
attendant to the person's confinement 168 and professional judgment
as to what best serves the needs of the individual, 169 and is made
within the context of the cost and difficulty of providing alternative
measures of care.
The Court acknowledges that the liberty interests of the confined
person are not absolute. 170 To determine whether state provision of
care violates due process rights, the individual's liberty interests
must be balanced against competing state justifications for
restraining individual liberty. 17 1 The state interests which the Court
references center on the administrative and fiscal challenges of
providing sufficient care for its charges.' 7 2  Safety, cost, and the
162. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 322.
163. Id. at 323.
164.Id. at 319.
165. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Soc. Servs. Dept., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989).
166. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319-320 (1982) ("[T]hese interests are not
absolute; indeed to some extent they are in conflict .... [I]n determining whether a substantive
right protected by the Due Process Clause has been violated, it is necessary to balance the 'liberty
of the individual' and the 'demands of an organized society' (quotation omitted). In seeking this
balance in other cases, the Court has weighed the individual's interest in liberty against the
State's asserted reasons for restraining individual liberty").
167. Id. at 319.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 322.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321.
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feasibility of facilitating a lesser, but minimally adequate, measure of
care are identified by the Court as state interests that may justify
infringement of an individual's substantive liberty interests.
The condition of confinement for orphans in foster care is
analogous to that of the involuntarily committed, 173 and creates the
special relationship with which the Court was concerned in
Youngberg. 174 The state has physical and legal custody of children in
state institutional facilities and legal custody of those placed in foster
care homes. The condition of confinement triggers the state's
fiduciary duty to provide the least restrictive adequate care. In the
adoption context, the adequacy of care can be measured according to
whether the state acts to facilitate or foreclose placement options that
serve or disserve orphans' developmental needs.175 The diversity of
circumstances and needs among orphans, 176  like those of the
involuntarily committed mentally retarded, warrant a particularized
examination of the capacity of each available placement to meet the
specific needs of each waiting child. A fact-specific examination of
what serves the best interests of the child (i.e., her emotional, mental
173. Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 808 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Observing, "foster
children, like the incarcerated or the involuntarily committed, are "placed . . . in a custodial
environment ... [and are] unable to seek alternative living arrangements (quotation omitted)."
We now hold that when the state places a child in state-regulated foster care, the state has entered
into a special relationship with that child which imposes upon it certain affirmative duties ....
We recognize that the analogy between foster children on the one hand and prisoners and
institutionalized persons on the other is incomplete .... Nonetheless, any distinctions between
children placed in foster care and the prisoners at issue in Estelle or the institutionalized mentally
retarded persons at issue in Youngberg are matters of degree rather than of kind (citation omitted)
... . In each of these cases the state, by affirmative act, renders the individual substantially
'dependent upon the state ... to meet [his or her] basic needs."' (quoting D.R. v. Middlebrooks
Area Vocational Tech., 972 F.2d 1364, 1372 (3d Cir. 1992)).
174. Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1439-40 (5th Cir. 1990) (Recognizing that orphans
have a liberty interests that informs the measure of care the State is obliged to provide while
acting within its custodial capacity, observing "[Texas Department of Human Services] created a
'special relationship' with the Griffiths' children when it removed them from their natural homes
and placed them under state supervision. At that time, TDHS assumed the responsibility to
provide constitutionally adequate care for these children .... [Any 'liberty interest' that the
children might have asserted under the 'special relationship' doctrine while in state custody
lapsed when the parents officially adopted the children").
175. White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects aspects of emotional well-being); Marisol A. v.
Guiliani, 929 F. Supp. 662, 675 (1996); see also LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 992-93
(D.D.C. 1991); Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, 1010 (N.D. Ill. 1989) ("the fact that
the plaintiffs injuries are psychological rather than physical is of no moment"); Doe v. N. Y. City
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 670 F. Supp. 1145, 1175-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Ashleigh Danielle v.
Adriazola, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1368 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
176. As has been noted, many orphans, and those who are the focus of this article, have
special needs.
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and physical well-being and development) must guide the
determination as to the appropriateness of a particular placement.
Permanency is consistently regarded as serving children's best
interests, 177 has been consistently acknowledged as the optimal
placement option for orphans,'1 78 and is the least restrictive and least
harmful option for orphans. 79  Accordingly, the state's fiduciary
duty should require care that facilitates rather than categorically
forecloses permanent placement, and orphans should be considered
to have a liberty interest in freedom from state action that forecloses,
rather than facilitates, permanent placement.
As Youngberg informs, orphans' liberty interests are not
absolute and must be balanced against competing state interests.
180
These interests include fiscal realities, administrative challenges, and
safety concerns. Economy favors state action that facilitates rather
than forecloses permanent placement over temporary placement.'
t8
It is generally more expensive for a state to provide temporary care
for an orphan than to secure permanent placement in an adoptive
home, even if the adoptive parents receive a state subsidy for
providing care to a child with special needs. 
82
177. Supra note 84.
178. Supra notes 85-89.
179. Richard P. Barth, Fred Wulczyn & Tom Crea, Foster Care, Termination of Parental
Rights, and Adoption: From Anticipation to Evidence: Research on the Adoption and Safe
Families Act, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 371, 374-75 (2005) ("Research showing that even
infants were experiencing multiple placements during the first six years of life - thirty percent of
those in non-kinship foster care - spurred the re-emergence of concerns about placement
instability. (citation omitted). Such research contradicted the notion that young children who
remained in long-term foster care experienced a life that was relatively stable or permanent").
180. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982).
181. States are projected to lose money in two ways pursuant to placement bans: 1) because
fewer children will be placed in adoptive homes states will not receive the monetary awards for
high placement rates and 2) because fewer children will be placed in adoptive homes the state
will have to finance the care of more children in foster and institutional care and will continue to
provide financial assistance for children who age out of the system. WILLIAMS REPORT, supra
note 21, at 19 ("A national ban on gay, lesbian and bisexual foster care could cost from $87 to
$130 million .. . . [C]osts to individual states could range from $100,000 to $27 million.");
Karen M. Doering & Carl A. Schuh, The High Cost of Denying Permanency: An Analysis of the
Economic Impact of Florida's Adoption Ban, NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS (March
2006).
182. DONALDSON REPORT, supra note 30, at 11-12 ("When adoptive families are not found
in a timely way, we not only fail vulnerable children who are depending on the system to ensure
that they get permanent families, but we incur considerable costs to care for them. Economic
analyses (citations omitted) . . . demonstrate that adoption is a less-expensive option. Barth and
colleagues found that local, state and federal governments save between $65,422 and $126,825
on the average child who enters care at age 3 if he or she is adopted rather than remaining in state
care throughout childhood. They project a national cost savings on the approximately 50,000
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In terms of administrative efforts, the ongoing monitoring and
supervision requirements that accompany foster care and
institutional care placements require a greater expenditure of time
and money than does the evaluative process for facilitating adoption,
which generally entails multiple home visits, interviews, and an
application requirement. To be sure, the state has a responsibility to
conduct a thorough investigation of each prospective parent and
home to ensure that the individuals will provide competent care and
an environment conducive to healthy child-rearing. This process can
be labor intensive and lengthy. However, once the child is placed
with the adoptive family there is significantly less state involvement,
and once the placement is finalized the adoptive family and parent-
child relationship enjoy the same constitutional protection against
state involvement as a biological family. Conversely, the state is
required to continuously monitor, supervise and, when the child is in
a state institution, care for orphans until they age-out of the system
and, in some instances, thereafter. Therefore, administrative
considerations also favor facilitating rather than foreclosing
permanent placement. Finally, in light of the documented harms
associated with temporary care compared with the benefits
associated with permanency, safety concerns also favor facilitating
rather than foreclosing permanent placement. Permanent placement
not only provides children with the stability they need, it also
provides security. None of the state's interests in foreclosing
permanent care options justify infringement of orphans' liberty
interest in freedom from state action that categorically bans care that
best serves their interests.
Youngberg may be interpreted to require the state to create and
cultivate placement options that serve orphans' best interests by
mitigating, rather than exacerbating, the likelihood of abuse, neglect
or damaging childhood experiences. The balancing Youngberg
children adopted from foster care each year of between $3.3 billion and $6.3 billion .... [T]he
human service costs of adoption are about one-half the costs of long-term foster care. Further...
when examining other social costs such as reduced incarceration or increased education
attainment, each dollar spent on the adoption of children from foster care results in $2.45 to $3.26
in tangible benefits to society as a whole."); see also, MARSHA GARRISON, PARENTS' RIGHTS VS.
CHILDREN'S INTERESTS: THE CASE OF THE FOSTER CHILD, IN FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION
READER 108, 108-09 (Naomi R. Cahn & Joan Heifetz Hollinger eds., 2004) (providing
comparative costs of adoption and foster care, explaining that when a "child is adopted by parents
who can afford to pay his keep, he costs the state nothing, and even subsidized adoption is
cheaper than foster care").
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requires, weighing the liberty interests of orphans against the state's
fiscal and administrative challenges, must be done in the context of
child welfare system realities in order to accurately capture the
benefits, risks and costs of competing placement options.
Categorical placement bans, which afford no individualized
examination of the needs of the child and the corresponding quality
of care offered by an available placement, direct the state to choose
in every instance care that is less beneficial, on balance, for the child,
more restrictive, and more expensive and time-consuming for the
state. "[T]he protection that foster children have is... the
requirement of state law that decisions about their placement be
determined in light of their best interest." 183 Pursuant to its fiduciary
duty, and in light of the comparative harms of permanent versus
temporary care, the state is obliged to find the least restrictive
placement based on the particularized needs of the orphan, the
corresponding qualities of the available adoptive home, and the
parental competencies of each potential parent.
J. Special Danger Basis for State's Fiduciary Duty
The Supreme Court continues to rely on DeShaney and
Youngberg as limiting the existence of the state's fiduciary duty to
circumstances where a person is within state custody, but other
"[c]ourts have seized upon... language in DeShaney to fashion
another exception to the general rule absolving state actors of
liability for harm caused by private parties: the state created danger
theory. 184  This theory of liability is 'predicated upon the states'
affirmative acts which work to the plaintiffs' detriment in terms of
exposure to danger' rather than upon a special relationship between
183. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 860 (1977).
184. McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 324-25 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that
many circuits have adopted some version of "state-created danger" theory); "With the exception
of the Fifth Circuit, and possibly the First and Fourth Circuits, the state-created danger exception
remains a viable theory in most jurisdictions. Nevertheless, it is difficult to synthesize a single
interjurisdictional standard for applying the state-created danger exception, which leads to some
variation among the circuits. Some courts have recognized the doctrine but have not articulated
specific circumstances in which the theory applies." Daniel Moore, Protecting Alien-Informants:
The State Created Danger Theory, Plenary Power Doctrine, and International Drug Cartels, 80
TEMP. L. REV. 295, 300-01 (2007); But cf Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 1061
n. 1 (9th Cir. 2006) (asserting that "the 'state-created danger' doctrine predates DeShaney and that
DeShaney is 'more reasonably understood as an acknowledgment and preservation of the doctrine
rather than its source"').
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the state and the victim."' 85  Pursuant to this theory, the state is
burdened with a fiduciary duty when, by affirmative conduct, it
exposes its charge to special danger. Courts have recognized a
constitutional tort duty to protect against dangers presented outside
of a strictly custodial context.' 86  This duty provides an even
stronger basis for application of the theory when the person for
whom the state is responsible is within a strictly custodial context
such as foster care. In the foster care context, the state action that
triggers the fiduciary duty to orphans is the enactment of placement
bans that limit permanent placement options, thereby exposing
orphans to the danger of documented harms of extended temporary
and institutional care.
187
The special relationship theory highlights the orphan's liberty
interest in freedom from government interference that impairs her
best interests. The special danger theory highlights the state's
affirmative duty to refrain from conduct which exposes those within
its care to harm. Both theories, which center on the fiduciary
obligations of the state, provide a basis for a substantive due process
challenge to placement bans. The orphan has no right to be placed in
an adoptive home, and the state has no duty to place her in an
adoptive home, so the state's failure to provide such a placement
does not constitute deprivation of an orphan's protected liberty
interest. 188 However, orphans do have liberty interest in being free
from state interference with a recognized interest in a permanent
placement, which best serves their interests. State enactment of
placement bans, which expose orphans to the harm of extended
temporary and institutional care, constitutes a breach of the state's
fiduciary duty to make placement decisions in light of orphans' best
interests, a deprivation of orphans' liberty interest in freedom from
care that does not serve their best interests, and a violation of
orphans' substantive due process rights. It is to the details of the
185. Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 807 n.6 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc) (quoting D.R. v.
Middlebrooks Area Vocational Tech., 972 F.2d 1364, 1374 (3d Cir. 1992)).
186. See generally, Scanlan v. Texas A&M University, 343 F.3d 533 (5th Cir. 2003); Penilla
v. City of Huntington Park, 115 F.3d 707 (9th Cit. 1997); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199 (3d
Cir. 1996).
187. Supra note 56.
188. Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1438 (5th Cir. 1990) ("DeShaney demonstrates that
the Due Process Clause does not demand positive assistance to secure constitutional rights").
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substantive due process challenge that Part III of this article now
turns.
III. The Constitutionality of Orphan Placement
Bans
A. The Character of Orphans' Liberty Interest
The characterization of orphans' negative liberty interest as
fundamental vel non dictates the constitutional scrutiny applicable to
placement bans that deprive orphans of that liberty interest. The
rights derived from the liberty interests that fall within the scope of
due process protection are characterized as either fundamental or
non-fundamental and are granted different degrees of constitutional
protection according to their status. 189 Within the substantive due
process context, state action that impairs a fundamental right will be
subject to strict scrutiny, and the state bears the burden of proving
that its action is necessary to achieve a compelling interest. 90 The
due process clause only affords constitutional protection to those
rights which are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," 191 such
that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed,"
or rights "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as
to be ranked as fundamental."' 192  Despite the Supreme Court's
reluctance to recognize new fundamental rights,1 93 it has done so
189. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (The Court notes that the Due
Process Clause "provides heightened protection against governmental interference with certain
fundamental rights and liberty interests"); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (explaining, "when a law exhibits ... a desire to harm a politically
unpopular group, . . . [the Court has] applied a more searching form of rational basis review to
strike down such laws... " (citations omitted)); see also City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528
(1973).
190. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (explaining, "laws that burden the
exercise of a fundamental right require strict scrutiny and are sustained only if narrowly tailored
to further a compelling governmental interest").
191. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
192. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
193. "The Court is most vulnerable and it comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with
judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the
Constitution .... [T]here should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive reach of
[the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments], particularly if it requires
redefining the category of rights deemed to be fundamental. Otherwise, the Judiciary necessarily
takes to itself further authority to govern the country without express constitutional authority."
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986).
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most frequently in the area of family relations.194 "A democratic
society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded
growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that
implies,"' 9 5 and permanency and the stability and security children
derive from it are universally regarded as best serving children's
developmental needs and well-being.196 The best interests of the
child standard should be considered to define, secure and protect
these quintessential entitlements of children within both the familial
and foster care contexts, and certain liberty interests derived from the
standard should be considered fundamental in character.
Supreme Court Justices have employed a variety of interpretive
tools in adjudicating fundamental rights. The most popular
interpretive device has been the use of traditional norms for
measuring and defining the significance and constancy of a
particular liberty interest. Inherent in the traditionalist method of
construction is the challenge of determining the level of specificity at
which the tradition, to which the liberty interest pertains, should be
defined. This determination informs whether the liberty interest
generates a right that qualifies for constitutional protection. 97 An
exceedingly narrow construction of the relevant tradition
circumscribes the scope of the Due Process Clause, invalidating
many interests as protected liberties. An exceedingly broad
construction of the relevant tradition expands the scope and
applicability of the Due Process Clause, qualifying a greater number
of related interests as protected liberties.198 Recently, in Lawrence v.
194. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312 (1980) ("The 'liberty' protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes not only the freedoms explicitly
mentioned in the Bill of Rights, but also a freedom of personal choice in certain matters of
marriage and family life.").
195. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).
196. Woodhouse, supra note 1.
197. "It is ... tempting . . . to suppose that the Due Process Clause protects only those
practices, defined at the most specific level, that were protected against governmental interference
by other rules of law when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified (citation omitted) .... [B]ut,
such a view would be inconsistent with our law .... The inescapable fact is that adjudication of
substantive due process claims may call upon the Court [to] exercise that same capacity which by
tradition courts have always exercised: reasoned judgment. Its boundaries are not susceptible of
expression as a simple rule." Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 849 (1992).
198. Justice Scalia passionately opposes the use of generalized traditions to adjudicate
fundamental values, observing, "general traditions provide such imprecise guidance, they permit
judges to dictate rather than discern the society's views. [Although] assuredly having the virtue
(if it be that) of leaving judges free to decide as they think best when the unanticipated occurs, a
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Texas, the Court departed from the traditionalist approach to rights
adjudication and employed a functional approach - one which
"looks beyond the American historical experience for insight both
contemporary and cross-cultural."1 99
Children's interests have and continue to operate to limit and
define the fundamental rights of parents, and inform the fiduciary
duties owed to children by both parents and the state qua parent.
The best interests standard enjoys both traditional and contemporary
significance and provides the yardstick by which the quality of care
to which children are entitled is measured. In the foster care context,
a liberty interest in freedom from state action that favors harmful
placements and categorically forecloses the permanency that serves
orphans' best interests should be considered fundamental in
character because "[flrom the waiting child's perspective, being
adopted means having a 'real' home and a 'real' family.
Foreclosing... adoption as an option... clearly deprives them of
something of great value. 2 °° Accordingly, orphans' liberty interest
in freedom from state action that categorically forecloses the
superior placement option should qualify as fundamental in
character, under either adjudication approach.
Though children's rights in the foster care context should be
deemed fundamental, that characterization is not necessary to
successfully challenge orphan placement bans as violative of
orphans' substantive due process interests.201 State impairment of a
rule of law that binds neither by text nor by any particular, identifiable tradition, is no rule at all."
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989).
199. Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" that Dare Not Speak
Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1937 (2004); The Court explains the utility of the functional
approach to rights adjudication thusly, "Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its
manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not presume to have this
insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws
once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures,
persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom."
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
200. Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 324.
201. As a policy matter, it is important that children's rights be accorded status as
fundamental rights. Arguably, rational basis review provides a more attractive constitutional test
because it does not require characterization of orphans' rights as fundamental as a prerequisite to
its application. However, a non-fundamental rights classification may subvert the value of the
right at issue. While strict scrutiny is a more exacting test, its application signals the fundamental
character of the rights infringed by state action and, in the child welfare context, accords
children's rights the constitutional status they deserve. For an analogous critique raised in
response to the application of rational basis review in Romer v. Evans see Robert D. Dobson,
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non-fundamental right is subject to rational basis review, a more
deferential constitutional test, which presumes that the challenged
state action is rationally related to the achievement of a legitimate
governmental interest.2 02 However, even under the more permissive
standard of review, the Supreme Court has held that certain liberty
interests "may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting
the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without
reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the
state to effect.
20 3
The legitimacy of the state's asserted interests in enacting orphan
placement bans should be determined in the context of the
substantial body of available research examining the impact of
adoption by gays and lesbians on orphans and the research reflecting
the developmental harm caused by extended foster and institutional
care. The critical inquiry is whether, within the context of child
welfare realities and relevant social science data, the bans "raise the
inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of
animosity toward the class of persons affected.",204 Where a law, as
the Supreme Court explained in Romer v. Evans, "is so
discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that ... [it] seems
inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it
lacks a relationship to legitimate state interests. ' ' 205 In the orphan
placement ban context there are two affected demographics -
orphans and prospective gay and lesbian adoptive parents. The vast
quantity of credible research documenting both the benefits orphans
experience in adoptive homes with gay and lesbian parents and the
substantial harm they experience in extended foster and institutional
care suggests that the state interests served by these bans are not the
preservation and protection of orphans' best interests, an end which
falls within the scope of the state's parens patriae authority and
Homosexual Discrimination and Gender: Was Romer v. Evans Really a Victory for Gay Rights?,
35 Cal. W. L. Rev. 271, 305 (1997) (observing, "the Court should have reviewed Amendment 2
using strict scrutiny review. Most of the briefs presented to the Court argued Amendment 2 was
invalid because it burdened a fundamental right, or should be reviewed under the strict scrutiny
standard because homosexuals are a suspect class (citation omitted)").
202. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (explaining that "rights guaranteed
by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some
purpose within the competency of the state").
203. Meyer v. Nebraska 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923).
204. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634
205. Id. at 632.
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fiduciary duty to those within its custody and care; rather, they are
focused on the preservation of heterosexual marriage and denying
gays and lesbians the privilege of adopting at the expense of children
waiting to be adopted.2 °6
The constitutionality of these bans should depend upon whether,
pursuant to a comparative harm calculus, the effect of placement
bans on orphans falls within the scope of the state's parens patriae
authority and fiduciary duty to provide for orphan's best interests.
This determination should be made in full view of the reality that for
many Black orphans the choice is between non-placement and
placement with gay and lesbian parents. The comparative harm
analysis provides the appropriate context for an assessment of the
legitimacy of the state's interest in enacting placement bans and
responds to operating child welfare realities by weighing the relative
harms of non-placement (i.e., the adverse impact of extended foster
and institutional care) against "thirty-five years of studies showing
that children of gay and lesbian parents are normal and healthy on
every measure of child development.,
20 7
B. Substantive Due Process Analysis
For those children entrusted to state custody, "the [s]tate is
supposed to proceed in respect of the child as parens patriae and not
as adversary., 20 8 Accordingly, the governmental interest that orphan
placement bans purportedly serve should qualify as compelling or
legitimate only if it advances, not impairs, orphans' best interests.
The best interests of the orphan, to whom the state owes a fiduciary
206. Infra, pp. 41.
207. Mary L. Bonauto, Civil Marriage as a Locus of Civil Rights Struggles, 30 HUMAN
RIGHTS Q. 3, 7 (2003). See also Michael S., Wald, Same-Sex Couple Marriage: A Family Policy
Perspective, 9 VA. J. SOC. POLICY & L. 291, 321 (2001) (observing that "all of the evidence
shows that children raised by gay parents develop just as well as children raised by heterosexual
couples."); National Center for Lesbian Rights, Policy Statements Supporting Adoption by Gay
and Lesbian People (This comprehensive report presents policy and position statements
supporting gay and lesbian parenting by the American Academy of Child & Adolescent
Psychiatry (1999); American Academy of Family Physicians (2002, 2003); American Academy
of Pediatrics (2002); American Bar Association (1995, 1999, 2003); American Medical
Association (2004); American Psychiatric Association (1997, 2002); American Psychoanalytic
Association (2002); American Psychological Association (1976, 2004); Child Welfare League of
America (1988, 2005); Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute (2006); National Association of
Social Workers (2002); and the North American Council on Adoptable Children (1998, 2002,
2005)) [hereinafter Policy Statements Supporting Adoption]. On file with author.
208. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966).
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duty, should restrain the state's parens patriae power. The state's
duties to protect both the interests of children and the general welfare
of citizens authorize it to remove a neglected or abused child from
her parents and home. 20 9  The power to regulate for the general
welfare is plenary; 210 however, if the interests of society and that of
the orphan are in conflict, the state's fiduciary duty under Youngberg
and the special danger cases should be read to require state action
that serves, rather than harms, the child's best interests. "[I]n the
adoption context, the state's overriding interest is the best interests of
the children whom it is seeking to place with adoptive families."
21
'
To satisfy rational basis review, and in its capacity as parens patriae,
the state must assert an interest served by these bans that is
consistent with orphans' best interests, not adverse to them.
In examining the constitutionality of placement bans, "[t]he
purpose of a statute must be determined from the natural and legal
effect of the language employed; and whether it is or is not
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States must be
determined from the natural effect of such statutes when put into
operation, and not from their proclaimed purpose." 21 2  The
proclaimed purpose of placement bans may be to protect and
promote the best interests of orphans, but its effect is to expose
greater numbers of orphans, particularly Black orphans, to the
documented harms of extended temporary and institutional care.21 3
In another adoption context, transracial adoption, Congress
identified the delay or denial of permanent placements for children
of color as the harmful effect of placement policies and practices
prohibiting transracial placement (i.e., placing an orphan with an
adoptive parent of a different race).214 Congress, which was not
209. Gellhorn, supra note 128, at 1198-99.
210. Id.
211. Lofton v. Keamey, 358 F.3d 804, 810 (1 th Cir. 2001).
212. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (rev'd on other grounds).
213. hIfra, pp. 9-11.
214. The Act addressed what Congress perceived to be a serious problem, "the delay or
denial of adoption of children of color while social service agencies searched for adoptive parents
of the same race or ethnicity." Barbara Woodhouse, "Are You My Mother?": Conceptualizing
Children's Identity Rights in Transracial Adoptions, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 107, 120
(1995). But see, Tanya Washington, Loving Grutter: Recognizing Race in TransRacial
Adoptions, 16 GEO. MASON U. CIv. RTs. L.J. 1, 3 (2005) (noting, both categorical prohibition of
transracial placements and categorical prohibition of any consideration of race in placement
determinations are harmful to the best interests of children of color and proposing that "the right
balance between the former and latter practices is to [allow transracial adoptions but] require
HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL
persuaded by arguments that the purpose of such practices and
policies was to protect orphans of color from the harms of transracial
placements, enacted The Howard Metzenbaum MultiEthnic
Placement Act of 1994 ("MEPA"),2 15 which was later amended 216 to
preclude any consideration of race in making adoption
determinations. Among the Act's stated purposes was "decreasing
the length of time that children wait to be adopted. ,,217 Despite a
tradition of race-matching (i.e., placing children with parents of the
same race), 2 11 strong opposition to transracial placements, 219 and
social science data documenting some harm caused by transracial
placements, 22  Congress determined the harm of non-placement to
outweigh any harm caused by transracial placement. Implicit in the
racial competency training for all transracial adoptive parents, so that adoptees are prepared to
deal with the racialized realities that await them outside their adoptive homes").
215. Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, §§ 551-55, 108 Stat. 3518,
4056-58 (Oct. 20, 1994).
216. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755 (1997).
Section 1808 of that Act, entitled "Removal of Barriers to Interethnic Adoption" provides in
pertinent part, "neither the State nor any other entity in the State that receives funds from the
Federal Government and is involved in adoption or foster care placements may deny to any
person the opportunity to become an adoptive or a foster parent on the basis of race, color, or
national origin of the person or of the child involved." 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(18)(A)(2001). This
enactment effectively repealed the provision of MEPA that accommodated some consideration of
race in placement determinations and eliminated the "best interests of the child" reference from
the statute.
217. Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, supra note 215, at § 552(b)-(3), 108 Stat. at 4056.
218. For a detailed description of the evolution of race-matching policies, practices and laws
see Washington, supra note 214, at 27 - 34.
219. At the height of transracial placements the National Association of Black Social
Workers issued a scathing indictment against the practice arguing,
Black children should be placed only with black families whether in
foster care or adoption. Black children belong, physically, psycho-
logically and culturally in Black families in order that they receive the total
sense of themselves and develop a sound projection of their future ....
[Black children in white homes are cut off from the healthy development of
themselves as Black people.
The socialization process for every child begins at birth. Included in the
socialization process is the child's cultural heritage, which is an important
segment of the total process. This must begin at the earliest moment;
otherwise our children will not have the background and knowledge
which is necessary to survive in a racist society. This is impossible if
the child is placed with white parents in a white environment . ...
We, [the members of the NABSW] have committed ourselves to go back to
our communities and work to end this particular form of genocide.
Nat'l Ass'n of Black Soc. Workers, Position Paper, 8 (Summer 1973).
220. Washington, supra note 214, at 15-27 (providing research data documenting outcomes
for transracial adoptees).
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amendment of MEPA to preclude any consideration of race in
placement determinations is an acknowledgment of the primacy of
permanent placement over delayed or non-placement. 221
In the context of orphan placement bans, the comparative harm
calculus employed in the context of transracial adoption, should
guide courts' determination of the constitutionality of these bans
according to the natural effect of these bans on orphans, particularly
Black orphans, who are overrepresented in the child welfare system
and experience greater placement challenges. In contrast to
transracial adoption where some research pointed to possible harm
resulting from placement with parents of a different race, the
overwhelming weight of the available research reporting outcomes
for orphans adopted by gay and lesbian parents and couples supports
no argument that permanent placement in homes with homosexual
parents harms orphans.222 Permanent placement in adoptive homes
has been confirmed as the best option for orphans. There is no
evidence that the primacy of permanent placement is compromised
by having gay and lesbian adoptive parents. 22 3  However, despite
substantial public and legislative support for adoption generally, a
surplus of available orphans, and a deficit of adults willing to adopt,
adoption by gay and lesbian couples and individuals continues to
generate substantial controversy.
The controversial nature of these placements has resulted in
increased scrutiny of gay and lesbian prospective parents and
generated a significant amount of research relating to their parental
224fitness. In contrast to the documented harms of extended
temporary and institutional care, there is a substantial body of
research documenting the benefits of gay adoption for adoptees. The
overwhelming quantity of available research in this area, measuring
well-being outcomes for children placed in homes with gay and
221. Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching
in Adoption, 139 u. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1185 (1991) (explaining, "[race-matching] policies have a
severe impact on minority children, often causing serious delays and permanent denial of
adoptive placement[s]").
222. Wald, supra note 207.
223. Wald, supra note 207, at 321 (noting, "all of the evidence shows that children raised by
gay parents develop just as well as children raised by heterosexual couples."). See also, David K.
Flacks, Gay and Lesbian Families: Judicial Assumptions, Scientific Realities, 3 WM. & MARY
BILL OF RIGHTS J. 345, 371 (1994) ("no evidence has emerged to date which suggests that
homosexual parents are inferior to their heterosexual counterparts, or that their children are in any
regard compromised.").
224. Bonauto, supra note 207, at 3.
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lesbian parents, demonstrates no greater degree of instability in the
parental relationship or developmental dysfunction with children.
225
A variety of reputable professional organizations, in recognition of
the wealth of available research documenting the positive outcomes
of gay adoption, have officially endorsed the position that placement
with same-sex couples does not harm orphans.
2 26
In spite of considerable evidence evincing the benefits of gay
adoption and in defense of its orphan placement ban, the state of
Florida offered the following justifications: heterosexual marital
families "provide the stability that marriage affords and the presence
of both male and female authority figures, which [the state]
considers critical to optimal childhood development and
socialization ' 227  and "disallowing adoption into homosexual
households, which are necessarily motherless or fatherless and lack
the stability that comes with marriage, is a rational means of
furthering Florida's interest in promoting adoption by marital
225. DONALDSON REPORT, supra note 30, at 14 ("Research shows that children fare just as
well with gay and lesbian parents when compared with children raised by heterosexuals (citation
omitted). There is limited research on long-term outcomes for children adopted by gays or
lesbians. However, 25 years of social science research concludes that children raised by such
parents fare well when compared to those raised by heterosexuals. Studies on lesbian parenting
and the few extant studies on gay parenting have found that their children are not disadvantaged
and, in some cases, receive unique benefits. No significant differences have been found, for
instance, between children of lesbian mothers and heterosexual mothers on a range of measures
of social and psychological adjustment such as anxiety, depression and self-esteem; or behavior
problems, social relationships or emotional difficulty. Children also fare similarly in school
performance and cognitive ability (citation omitted). Studies also have examined the sexual
orientation of children with gay or lesbian parents. Because those who oppose parenting by gays
and lesbians perceive their sexual orientation as negative, they have raised the concern that these
children are at greater 'risk' of not being heterosexual. Without regard to the underlying merits of
these beliefs, it is notable that the significant majority of empirical studies show the sexual
orientation of children is not associated with family type (citation omitted). Some studies have
shown that the daughters (not the sons) of lesbians were more likely to report same-sex romantic
exploration, although later sexual orientation did not differ from children raised in heterosexually
led households. A few studies have found that children of lesbian and gay parents fare better on
some measures than their peers, including school involvement (citation omitted) and ability to
discuss sexual development with parents (citation omitted). Studies also have found greater
involvement and more equality in parenting by both parents in families headed by gays and
lesbians. (citations omitted).").
226. For a comprehensive compilation of official policy positions taken by professional
associations on the issue of gay adoption see Policy Statements Supporting Adoption, supra note
207; Only one professional organization, the American College of Pediatrics, has issued a
statement unsupportive of parenting by lesbian, gay, and bisexuals individuals. WILLIAMS
REPORT, supra note 21, at 4.
227. Lofton v. Kearney, 358 F.3d 804, 818 (1 1th Cir. 2001).
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families. 228  The Supreme Court has made clear, "the fact that a
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law
prohibiting the practice." 229 Florida's justification for its placement
ban is focused on depriving gays and lesbians of the privilege of
adoption and the preservation of heterosexual marriage, without
regard for the harmful impact of these bans on orphans. Florida
legislators ignored the reality that the choice for many orphans,
particularly Black orphans,2 3 0  is not between placement with
homosexual couples or individuals or placement with heterosexual
couples or individuals; rather it is between placement and non-
placement. Ignoring this reality allows the state to turn a blind eye to
the fact that categorical placement bans "virtually assure[ ] that
some... children will never be adopted, a result which simply
cannot be viewed as promoting their interests., 231  In light of the
harmful effect of these bans on orphans, it is difficult to characterize
the state interests served by them as legitimate or as falling within
the state's parens patriae authority or as being in accordance with its
fiduciary duty to act in furtherance of orphans' best interests.
The adverse effect of orphan placement bans on orphans
represent a violation of their liberty interests and a breach of the
state's fiduciary duty to act in furtherance of their best interests.
These bans categorically foreclose permanent placement
opportunities without conducting the individualized determination of
the needs of the orphan, the qualities of the available placement, and
the competencies of the prospective adoptive parents, 232 which the
228. Id.; For a detailed discussion of the variety of reasons offered by proponents of Utah's
orphan placement ban, see Scott H. Clark, Married Persons Favored as Adoptive Parents: The
Utah Perspective, 5 J. L. FAM. STUD. 203, 217-221 (2003).
229. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
230. The child around whom the controversy centered in Lofton was Black.
231. Strasser, supra note 4, at 440.
232. Contrast the categorical character of placement bans as they pertain to prospective gay
and lesbian parents with Congressional prohibition of generalized placement determinations in
the context of trans-racial adoptions. "MEPA Policy Guidance makes a modest departure from
the categorical prohibition of the consideration of race when it is determined in the context of an
individualized assessment of adoptee needs and parental competencies (citation omitted) but
prohibits 'generalizations about the identity needs of children of a particular race or ethnicity
or... generalizations about the abilities of prospective parents of one race or ethnicity to care for,
or nurture the sense of identity of a child of another race, culture, or ethnicity."' Washington,
supra note 214, at 37-38.
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best interests standard requires. The best interests of an orphan
cannot be served effectively in the absence of a particularized
determination of the benefits and detriments of an available
placement option, in full view of the alternative, more harmful
option of extended temporary or institutionalized care.234
IV. Conclusion
Orphan placement bans cannot be said to serve orphans' best
interests when they operate to further limit the pool of available
prospective parents, and disregard the increasing supply of adoptable
children, whose only alternative is confinement to temporary and
institutional care. 23  Accordingly, these bans serve neither
legitimate nor compelling government ends; nor are they rationally
related or narrowly tailored to serve the best interests of orphans.
Finally, they do not honor the state's fiduciary duty to protect the
interests of children within its custody. These are the only
permissible ends the state is authorized to pursue when operating
within the scope of its parens patriae power. These bans foreclose
permanent placement options that would provide children with the
environment best suited to their well-being and development.
Accordingly, they increase orphans' exposure to the developmental
harms associated with extended temporary and institutional care.
Selecting between the secure and stable environment that adoption
provides and the transient, less stable, and less secure environment
that temporary and institutional care provide is hardly a Hobbesian
choice. In categorically limiting or foreclosing a child's most
beneficial placement option, the state in effect selects his/her most
harmful placement option. This deprivation violates orphans'
substantive due process rights and infringes their liberty interest in
freedom from state action that runs counter to their best interests.
233. Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 327 (emphasizing, "[e]very child deserves an
individualized assessment of his or her best interests.").
234. Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 325 (noting, "Categorical bans on adoption prevent child
welfare experts from making the best individual child-parent match where a gay or lesbian parent
can best meet the needs of a child (citation omitted)").
235. Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 325 ("All other things being equal, the more potential
adoptive parents that are available, the greater the likelihood that those state actors entrusted with
promoting the child's welfare will be able to make a placement that truly serves the child's best
interests.").
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It is in the best interests of Black orphans, as is the case with
orphans of every race, to experience permanency and its attributes,
and the state has a fiduciary duty to refrain from enacting placement
bans that deprive them of that essential childhood experience. To
allow the state to do so, inevitably exposes thousands of Black
orphans, already challenged by racialized child welfare realities and
placement obstacles, to the additional harm of extended temporary
and institutional care - an unconstitutional and unconscionable
consequence.

